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Article
Unconscious Racism Revisited:
Reflections on the Impact and Origins of
“The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection”
CHARLES LAWRENCE III
Twenty years ago, Professor Charles Lawrence wrote “The Id, The Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism.” This article is
considered a foundational document of Critical Race Theory and is one of the
most influential and widely cited law review articles. The article argued that the
purposeful intent requirement found in Supreme Court equal protection doctrine
and in the Court’s interpretation of antidiscrimination laws disserved the value of
equal citizenship expressed in those laws because many forms of racial bias are
unconscious.
Professor Lawrence suggested that rather than look for
discriminatory motive, the Court should examine the cultural meaning of laws to
determine the presence of collective, unconscious racism. In this Article,
Professor Lawrence discusses the origins and impact of his groundbreaking
article. He notes that while an increasingly conservative Supreme Court majority
has ignored his call to recognize the presence of unconscious racism and to
consider the meaning of cultural text, an important body of research and
scholarship has emerged to substantiate his assertion concerning the ubiquity of
unconscious racial bias. He applauds the work that has advanced our
understanding of unconscious bias, but he expresses concern that this
scholarship’s focus on the mechanisms of cognitive categorization rather than on
the history and culture of racial subordination embedded in our unconscious may
have undermined the central lesson of his article: to advance the understanding of
racism as a societal disease and to argue that the Constitution commands our
collective responsibility for its cure.

931

ARTICLE CONTENTS
PROLOGUE ..................................................................................... 933
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 935
II. THE ARTICLE’S ORIGINS: WHAT DID I HOPE TO DO? .... 942
III. WHAT HAVE THEY DONE WITH MY SONG?: TWO
RESPONSES TO THE ARTICLE ............................................. 951
A. RACISM REPRESSED: THE SUPREME COURT AS SOCIETAL SUPER
EGO....................................................................................... 951
B. A TWO-EDGED SWORD: THE EMERGING SCIENCE OF IMPLICIT
BIAS ...................................................................................... 956
IV. HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE “FLOOD BEFORE THE
FLOOD” ..................................................................................... 966
EPILOGUE ....................................................................................... 969

Unconscious Racism Revisited:
Reflections on the Impact and Origins of
“The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection”
CHARLES LAWRENCE III∗
PROLOGUE
The Headline reads, “Justices Limit the Use of Race in School Plans
for Integration.”
WASHINGTON, June 28—With competing blocs of
justices claiming the mantle of Brown v. Board of Education,
a bitterly divided Supreme Court declared Thursday that
public school systems cannot seek to achieve or maintain
integration through measures that take explicit account of a
student’s race.
Voting 5 to 4, the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
John G. Roberts, Jr., invalidated programs in Seattle and
metropolitan Louisville, Ky., that sought to maintain schoolby-school diversity by limiting transfers on the basis of race
or using race as a “tiebreaker” for admission to particular
schools.
Both programs had been upheld by lower federal courts
and were similar to plans in place in hundreds of school
districts around the country. Chief Justice Roberts said such
programs were “directed only to racial balance, pure and
simple,” a goal he said was forbidden by the Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection.
“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to
stop discriminating on the basis of race,” he said. His side of
the debate, the chief justice said, was “more faithful to the
heritage of Brown,” the landmark 1954 decision that

∗

Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., Haverford College, 1965; J.D.,
Yale Law School, 1969. My thanks go to James Forman, Mari Matsuda, and Lama Abu-Odeh for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article, to the contributors to this Symposium for their
thoughtful engagement with my work, and to Jonathan Small for his excellent research assistance.
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declared school segregation unconstitutional.

I am in Hawaii, six time zones away from the scene of the crime. Our
New York Times will not arrive until evening, and I’m reading this news on
my web browser. I sit staring at the screen, trying to figure out what I’m
feeling. I’m stunned and disappointed, but it’s much more than that. I feel
assaulted, as if someone has caught me by surprise and hit me in the gut.
I’m trying to catch my breath, to gather my wits, to pull myself together
before this guy hits me again. I’m angry at myself, thinking, “What’s
wrong with you, Lawrence? Why are you letting this thing get to you?”
It’s not like it was a sneak attack. I’d seen it coming from the moment I’d
heard the Court had taken cert.2 Back in December I’d sat in my office and
listened to the oral argument. I could hear the Court majority’s
commitment to white supremacy, as much in their voices as in the content
of their questions.3 I could have written Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion
that very day—the rape of Brown v. Board of Education and the claim that
she had consented,4 the assault on her already badly beaten body,5 and the
1
Linda Greenhouse, Justices, Voting 5-4, Limit the Use of Race in Integration Plans, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 2007, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
2
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert.
granted, 75 U.S.L.W. 3018 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908), Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 75 U.S.L.W. 3018 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05915).
3
See Charles R. Lawrence III, Anatomy of an Oral Argument: The Racial Meaning of Things Said
and Unsaid, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (exploring the cultural meaning of the texts—and
silences—of the oral arguments in Parents Involved in Community Schools and Meredith to ask how
the Court conveys its belief in white supremacy even as it requires that we not speak “out loud” about
race and racism) (on file with author and Connecticut Law Review).
4
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts claimed the mantle of Brown to strike down the
school integration programs. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.Ct.
2738, 2765 (2007) (“Again, this approach to racial classifications is fundamentally at odds with our
precedent, which makes clear that the Equal Protection Clause ‘protect[s] persons, not groups’ . . . .
This fundamental principle goes back, in this context, to Brown itself.”) (quoting Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)) [hereinafter PICS]. Not content with
misrepresenting the court’s own precedent, the Chief Justice claimed that Thurgood Marshall and the
team of lawyers who argued Brown embraced his reading of the of the Equal Protection Clause. See id.
at 2767 (“The parties and their amici debate which side is more faithful to the heritage of Brown, but
the position of the plaintiffs in Brown was spelled out in their brief and could not have been clearer:
‘[T]he Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from according differential treatment to American
children on the basis of their color or race.’”).
5
The Supreme Court had already retreated from its commitment to integration. See generally
Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American Public Education Today, 52 AM. U. L. REV.
1461 (2003) (noting the Supreme Court’s role in hindering desegregation efforts); GARY ORFIELD &
SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION (1996). For example, in Milliken v. Bradley, the Court held that Detroit could not remedy
its de jure segregation through a school integration plan that included surrounding white suburbs unless
the suburbs had also perpetrated de jure segregation. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 721–22, 744–
45 (1974); see generally Charles R. Lawrence III, Segregation “Misunderstood”: The Milliken
Decision Revisited, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 15 (1977). The Court further demonstrated its disregard for
integration in a series of cases lifting desegregation orders even when the effect of lifting the order
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defamation of her principles and of those who had labored for her birth. I
could see it coming like a tidal wave, like the torches of the Klan riding in
the night. Why, then, was I caught with my guard down, so poorly
defended? Why, even now, was I trying to figure out what hit me? Why
was I feeling as if I too had been beaten and violated?
I. INTRODUCTION
The editors of the Connecticut Law Review have done me a great
honor. They have assembled an esteemed group of judges, litigators,
activists, and scholars and asked that they consider whether an article that I
wrote twenty years ago may have asked a question, begun a conversation,
or offered an insight that has influenced their own good work or had an
impact on the way we think about law, science, the human mind, race, and
power. They have asked me to open this retrospective by reflecting upon
and evaluating my own work. I find this task more than a little daunting. I
understand that if I have gained some status as an elder among
constitutional scholars and Critical Race Theorists,7 I may have done so
primarily through my efforts and good fortune to just stay alive. But
staying alive is no mean task for a black man in America,8 so I’ll gladly
would cause resegregation. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100–02 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503
U.S. 467, 495–96 (1992); Board of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248
(1991). The result has meant the resegregation of American schools. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Education: The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV.
1597, 1622 (2003) (“Tragically today, America has schools that are increasingly separate and
unequal.”).
6
See PICS, 127 S.Ct. at 2782 (“[M]y view was the rallying cry for the lawyers who litigated
Brown.”).
7
My life’s work is writing and teaching about constitutional law and critical race theory. See,
e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 327–28 (1987) [hereinafter Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection]; Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus,
1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 437–38 [hereinafter Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go]; CHARLES R.
LAWRENCE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON’T GO BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 5–7 (1997). This work is heavily cited in judicial opinions and scholarly writing. See Ian
Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, Interpreting Legal Citations: Determinants of Citations to Articles in Elite
Law Reviews, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 432–33, 434 (2000) (listing The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection as the first or second most-cited law review article of all-time); Fred R. Shapiro, The MostCited Legal Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 769, 777 (1996) (listing The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection as the sixty-first most cited law review article of all-time and If He Hollers Let Him
Go as one of the most-cited articles published in 1990); see, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
332–33 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection); Jerry Kang,
Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1496 (2005); Frank I. Michelman, Brown at Fifty:
Reasonable Umbrage: Race and Constitutional Antidiscrimination Law in the United States and South
Africa, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1378, 1383 n.30 (2004); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent,
Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1351,
1355 (1991).
8
Blacks bear a disproportionate risk of disease, injury, death, and disability in the United States.
CDC, HEALTH DISPARITIES EXPERIENCED BY BLACK OR AFRICAN AMERICANS: UNITED STATES, 54
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take credit, if only for that.
This essay seeks to understand and articulate the injury that racism or
white supremacy and its reiteration in the law does to African Americans,
to other people of color, and ultimately to us all. I have tried to make this
work my vocation.9 As teacher, activist, and scholar I have aspired to the
tradition of radical teaching that historian Vincent Harding has named
“The Word.”10 “The Word” articulates and validates our common
experience. It seeks the reasons for oppression. It is the practice of
struggle against dehumanization. This is the tradition that inspired my
work in 1987, and it guides my effort in this essay. I cannot reflect on The
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection outside of the context of this larger
vocational aspiration.
I begin this piece, as I did The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, with
narrative.11 In both narratives I am considering a text, and in each
narrative I tell of my response to the text, of the thoughts and feelings the
text evokes. Both texts are filled with racial images. The exaggerated
broad noses, thick lips, and unkempt hair on the visages of Little Black
Sambo and his parents, Mumbo and Jumbo, reveal the consciously
embraced white supremacist ideology of the late 19th century, when the
MORBIDITY
AND
MORTALITY
WEEKLY
REPORT
1
(2005),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5401.pdf; CDC, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2004, at 147 tbl.29
(2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus04trend.pdf#03. In 2004, the life expectancy
for black males in the United States was 69.5 years, compared to 75.7 years for white males. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 76 tbl.101 (2008), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/08abstract/vitstat.pdf. Blacks also experience significantly
higher infant mortality rates. Id. at 82 tbl.109; CDC FACT SHEET, RACIAL/ETHNIC HEALTH
DISPARITIES (Apr. 2, 2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/pressrel/fs040402.htm.
9
I explore this vocational aspiration in Charles R. Lawrence III, The Word and the River:
Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2236–37 (1992).
10
See VINCENT HARDING, THERE IS A RIVER: THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM IN AMERICA,
at xviii–xxi, 82 (1981) (recounting the history of black radicalism in America).
11
The prologue to The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection begins with the following description of
my experience as a kindergartener at a predominately white private school in New York:
It is circle time in the five-year old group, and the teacher is reading us a book.
As she reads, she passes the book around the circle so that each of us can see the
illustrations. The book’s title is Little Black Sambo. Looking back, I remember
only one part of the story, one illustration: Little Black Sambo is running around a
stack of pancakes with a tiger chasing him. He is very black and has a minstrel's
white mouth. His hair is tied up in many pigtails, each pigtail tied with a different
color ribbon. I have seen the picture before the book reaches my place in the circle.
I have heard the teacher read the “comical” text describing Sambo's plight and have
heard the laughter of my classmates. There is a knot in the pit of my stomach. I feel
panic and shame. I do not have the words to articulate my feelings—words like
“stereotype” and “stigma” that might help cathart the shame and place it outside of
me where it began. But I am slowly realizing that, as the only black child in the
circle, I have some kinship with the tragic and ugly hero of this story—that my
classmates are laughing at me as well as at him. I wish I could laugh along with my
friends. I wish I could disappear.
Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 317.
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book first was published. The story in the Court’s opinion in Parents
Involved in Community Schools (hereinafter “PICS”) is also filled with the
faces of Black children and their parents.13 This contemporary text paints
the black faces with the abstract language of constitutional doctrine.
Words like “suspect classification,” “compelling state interests,” and
“narrow tailoring” describe no noses or lips. Chief Justice Roberts says he
sees no color (blackness) in these families’ faces, except that which the
school districts’ plans have painted and the Constitution compels him to
erase.14 But I see the faces of the children who trigger racial tie-breakers
and from whom white families flee.15 I see the faces of the parents who
12

HELEN BANNERMAN, THE STORY OF LITTLE BLACK SAMBO (Grant Richards 1st ed. 1899).
Of course, the heroine in Chief Justice Roberts’s story is white—the white mother denied the
chance to send her daughter to the school of her choice, the best school, the white school. The white
victim of discrimination stands at center stage in Justice Roberts’s story, but the black faces that stand
offstage give the story meaning.
14
Consider the following quotes from Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion:
This working backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than
working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the
purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our existing precedent. We have many times
over reaffirmed that “[r]acial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake.”
PICS, 127 S.Ct. at 2757 (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 513 U.S. 467, 494 (1992)).
“Classifying and assigning schoolchildren according to a binary conception of race is an extreme
approach in light of our precedents and our Nation’s history of using race in public schools, and
requires more than such an amorphous end to justify it.” Id. at 2760.
“Simply because the school districts may seek a worthy goal does not mean they are free to
discriminate on the basis of race to achieve it, or that their racial classifications should be subject to less
exacting scrutiny.” Id. at 2765.
“For schools that never segregated on the basis of race, such as Seattle, or that have removed the
vestiges of past segregation, such as Jefferson County, the way ‘to achieve a system of determining
admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis’ . . . is to stop assigning students on a racial basis.”
Id. at 2768 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1955)).
Roberts never mentions the race of the children he says have been “segregated,” “classified,”
“assigned,” “balanced,” and “discriminated” against. In this way he separates each word from the
context that gives them meaning.
15
Segregation in public schools has been exacerbated by “white flight” from the urban housing
market. In PICS, Justice Breyer noted in dissent that the school district integration plans were in part
aimed to discourage “white flight.” PICS, 127 S.Ct. at 2828 (“Nor could the school districts have
accomplished their desired aims (e.g., avoiding forced busing, countering white flight, maintaining
racial diversity) by other means.”). Justice Breyer also cited a report describing the importance of the
link between housing and education policy. Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation:
Impacts on Metropolitan Society, in PURSUIT OF A DREAM DEFERRED: LINKING HOUSING AND
EDUCATION POLICY 121 (John A. Powell et al. eds. 2001). An amicus brief submitted by Housing
Scholars and Research & Advocacy Organizations explained that “[w]ithout question, the federal
government and individual housing authorities played an active and deliberate role in concentrating
poverty in the racially segregated public housing they created” which has resulted in, among other
things, segregated public schools. Brief for Housing Scholars and Research & Advocacy Organizations
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15, PICS, 127 S.Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915);
see also SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE
UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 103 (2004); Raymond A. Mohl, Planned Destruction: The
Interstates and Central City Housing, in FROM TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR HOMES: IN SEARCH OF AN
URBAN HOUSING POLICY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 226, 226–45 (John F. Bauman et al. eds.,
13
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know that no one will fix the leaking roof at their children’s school or
repair the toilets or teach advanced placement Calculus and Chemistry,
unless there are also white children there.16 I see the faces that Justice
Roberts would render colorless, and they are black like my face. They, and
I, look nothing like the characters in Little Black Sambo, but neither did
our great grandparents in 1890.17
As I read each of these texts, I know I am not reading alone. The other
children in my kindergarten class have seen how Sambo is portrayed and
noticed his kinship to me.18 Although few Americans will read the full text
of the Chief Justice’s opinion, most will hear some version of his story.
The feelings of humiliation, anger, powerlessness, and disappointment I
experience as I read the new desegregation decision are caused not so
much by the text itself as by my knowledge that this text is read by a larger
community and by the meaning that community will give it.
I first used the term “cultural meaning” in The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection.19 Although scholars most often read and cite the article for its
introduction of the theories and science of unconscious motivation to the
discussion of equal protection doctrine,20 the cultural meaning of racial
2000) (describing how the Interstate Highway system destroyed low-income housing and helped
further “residential segregation agendas”). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has given short shrift to
the importance of this link. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 748 (1974) (striking down a
city’s public school integration program because it involved surrounding white suburbs).
16
See Charles R. Lawrence III, Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Privacy, and Community (A
Continuing conversation with John Ely on Racism and Democracy) 114 YALE L.J. 1353, 1395 (2005)
(discussing the ways that poor minority children who attend integrated schools benefit by the social and
political capital that middle class and white parents bring to those schools); see also RICHARD D.
KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL
CHOICE 47 (2001).
17
Racial imagery and iconography has long been associated with racial ideology in the United
States. See JANETTE LAKE DATES & WILLIAM BARLOW, SPLIT IMAGE: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE
MASS MEDIA 3 (1990) (discussing the struggle to control images of African Americans in mass media
in order to maintain the ideological hegemony of white supremacy); CATHERINE SILK & JOHN SILK,
RACISM AND ANTI-RACISM IN AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE (1990) (discussing the treatment of
African American characters and themes in literature and film from the Civil War era to the mid
1980s); STERLING A. BROWN, THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN FICTION 1–4 (1969) (identifying racial
stereotypes of African Americans in American fiction and noting the difference in treatment of African
American fictional characters by white and black authors).
18
See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 317 (“[I] am slowly
realizing that, as the only black child in the circle, I have some kinship with the tragic and ugly hero of
this story—that my classmates are laughing at me as well as him.”).
19
See id. at 355–56 (“I propose a test that would look to the ‘cultural meaning’ of an allegedly
racially discriminatory act as the best available analogue for and evidence of the collective unconscious
that we cannot observe directly.”).
20
See, e.g., Charles F. Abernathy, Legal Realism and the Failure of the “Effects” Test for
Discrimination, 94 GEO. L.J. 267, 268 n.4 (2006); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 n.11 (1995); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,”
44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 22 (1991).
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texts remains, for me, the central and most important idea in the article.21
Perhaps I am at fault for giving the article a title that so provocatively
evokes the outsized personage and controversial theory of Sigmund Freud,
but my primary project in that article was not to explain or promote any
particular theory of the unconscious.22 Rather, I was most concerned with
exploring how white supremacy is maintained not only through the
intentional deployment of coercive power,23 but also through the creation,
interpretation, and assimilation of racial text.24
21
See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 358 (“Indeed,
construction of text is the most basic of judicial tasks. And while most judicial interpretation involves
determining the meaning of written text, legal theorists have recognized that meaningful human
behavior can be treated as a ‘text-analogue.’”); see also id. at nn.188–89 (“‘In spoken discourse, the
subjective intention of the speaker and the objective meaning of the discourse overlap, while with
written discourse the meaning of the text is disassociated from the mental intention of the author and
the two no longer coincide. Likewise, spoken discourse ultimately refers to the contextual situation
common to the speaker and the listener. Texts, on the other hand, speak about the world. The text
frees itself from the reference of the particular situation in which its author speaks and creates its own
universe of references.’”) (quoting PAUL RICOEUR & JOHN B. THOMPSON, HERMENEUTICS AND THE
HUMAN SCIENCES: ESSAYS ON LANGUAGE, ACTION AND INTERPRETATION 200–02 (1981)).
22
See Kang, supra note 7, at 1496 n.28 (“Lawrence’s work is consistent with the claims of this
Article, broadly stated. Moreover, its exploration of unconscious racism, based on psychology, is a
crucial intellectual precursor. However, social cognition is a very different psychology from that of
Freud and psychoanalysis.”); Krieger, supra note 20, at 1164 n.11 (“Drawing on psychoanalytic theory,
Professor Lawrence argues that much of what is classified as disparate treatment discrimination results
from subconscious instincts and motivations.”).
23
At the time, critical legal studies scholars were focusing on how legal ideology and
consciousness induces consent to racial oppression. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331,
1350–55 (1988) (“The concept of hegemony allows Critical scholars to explain the continued
legitimacy of American society by revealing how legal consciousness induces people to accept or
consent to their own oppression.”). This line of thinking ignored important aspects of racial
domination through coercion. See id. at 1357 (“The Critics’ principal error is that their version of
domination by consent does not present a realistic picture of racial domination. Coercion explains
much more about racial domination than does ideologically induced consent. Black people do not
create their oppressive worlds moment to moment but rather are coerced into living in worlds created
and maintained by others.”).
24
See generally R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 860 (2004) (“Minstrelsy—an entertainment form that showed white performers
in blackface mocking the stereotypical black characters—produced additional stereotypes, to include
the lazy, wise-cracking Sapphire woman and the elederly [sic], crippled, and shuffling Jim Crow. The
Harlem Renaissance produced vastly improved (if still imperfect) depictions of African-American life,
as did the Civil Rights movement and more recent efforts by African Americans and others in music,
literature, and cinema. But the negative stereotypes and images far outnumber those that are positive
and have proved far more enduring. One can see modern analogues of the Sambo, black beast, Jezebel,
and Sapphire tropes in ads and televisions shows from the 1970s, 1980s, and even the 1990s.”); see
also Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 56 (1994) (“Racial ideology, for example as
embodied in segregation, powerfully sculpts communities in U.S. society.”); MICHAEL OMI &
HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980S, at 78
(1986) (noting the role of the state in racial formation and ideology); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Ideology As a
Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 193, 231 (Basic Books, Inc. 1973) (exploring
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This Article revisits that exploration with the benefit of twenty years of
hindsight. I begin with the origins of the article. My comrade in Critical
Race theory, Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw, once asked, “What was it you
hoped to do in writing this piece?” Part II answers that question. I explore
personal, political, professional, and analytic motivations and goals,
without drawing sharp lines of demarcation between these interrelated
inspirations and purposes. In Part III I ask, “What have they done with my
song?” What has this article wrought? How has it been received,
understood, misunderstood, embraced, rejected and employed? What has
been its influence, or lack thereof, on the Supreme Court, on dominant
constitutional discourse and on the law’s response to the “American
Dilemma”?25 How have the ideas I introduced in this article been applied
by social scientists, litigators, judges and other scholars?
Part III contains two subparts. In Part A, I offer an account and
critique of how an increasingly conservative Supreme Court majority has
not only ignored my scholarly intervention but has marched relentlessly
and radically, not to mention intentionally, in the opposite direction of my
call to give attention to the meaning of racial text.26 This doctrinal march
to re-segregation in the name of “colorblindness” culminates in the recent
Seattle and Kentucky desegregation decisions.27 In The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection, I challenged the Court’s refusal in Washington v. Davis
to ask whether there was constitutional injury in the cultural meaning of
racially discriminatory impact. In PICS, the Court’s majority strikes down
two voluntary school desegregation plans, asserting that all facially racial
classifications must receive strict scrutiny. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion
for the majority offers no coherent explanation for this rule. Instead, he
proclaims it settled doctrine. This rule gains authority through the Court’s
power to proclaim its truth. It achieves the pretense of reason only by
taking the question of racial meaning off the table. Desegregation can only
inflict the same injury as segregation if we ignore the question of what
each signifies. Only in this Alice in Wonderland world, where racial
the nature of ideology in societies and defining ideology as “that part of culture which is actively
concerned with the establishment and defense of patterns of belief and value”) (quotation marks
omitted).
25
See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY lxxi (1962) (“The ‘American Dilemma,’ referred to in the title of this book, is the everraging conflict between, on the one hand, the valuations preserved on the general plane which we shall
call the ‘American Creed,’ where the American thinks, talks, and acts under the influence of high
national and Christian precepts, and, on the other hand, the valuations on specific planes of individual
and group living, where personal and local interests; economic, social, and sexual jealousies;
considerations of community prestige and conformity; group prejudice against particular persons or
types of people; and all sorts of miscellaneous wants, impulses, and habits dominate his outlook.”).
26
See infra notes 56–75 and accompanying text.
27
See PICS, 127 S.Ct. 2738, 2767–68 (2007) (“What do the racial classifications do in these
cases, if not determine admission to a public school on a racial basis?”).
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classifications are devoid of meaning, can a remedy to the injury identified
in Brown v. Board of Education28 become the injury itself.29
Part B discusses some of the considerable and important body of
research and literature that has emerged since the advent of my article.
Cognitive psychologists have employed carefully constructed research and
sound scientific methodology to substantiate my article’s assertion that we
are all influenced by racial bias, much of which we are unaware. Legal
scholars, including Linda Krieger, Jerry Kang, Devon Carbado, and
others30 have drawn on this social science and made the work accessible to
lawyers and civil rights activists who have, in turn, used it well to do the
important political work of educating the courts and the public about the
28

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
The incoherence and absurdity of the Court plurality’s reasoning is made apparent by a line of
questioning at oral argument in Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education. Justice Ginsburg
asks plaintiffs counsel, Mr. Gordon, how the school district’s desegregation system that he is
challenging “compares with the system that was in effect from . . . 1975 until 2000.” (A federal district
court had ordered this plan as a remedy having found that the School District had unconstitutionally
segregated its schools.)
Mr. Gordon: I’m sorry. It’s the same remedial program that—this court has
found . . . that when the remedial program has achieved its result we should no
longer carve out that exemption under the Equal Protection Clause.
Justice Ginsburg: Do you think there’s something of an anomaly there, that you
have a system that is forced on the school that it doesn't want it, works for 25 years,
and then the school board doesn’t have to keep it any more, but it decides it's
worked rather well, so we’ll keep it. What’s constitutionally required one day gets
constitutionally prohibited the next day.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007)
(No. 05-915). After Mr. Gordon fumbles thorough several unsuccessful attempts to answer Justice
Ginsburg’s question, Justice Scalia comes to his rescue.
Justice Scalia: Mr. Gordon, isn’t it the case that once you’ve achieved unitary
status, which means that the effects of past intentional discrimination have been
eliminated, the only way you can lose unitary status is to discriminate intentionally?
Isn’t that right?
Id. Justice Souter then takes up the questioning asking if there is not an important difference between a
court’s finding of “unitary status” (a legal construction) and a “unitary condition” (a descriptive term).
Justice Souter asks, “is the preservation of a unitary condition a legitimate or indeed a compelling
governmental objective?” Id. at 5. Justice Breyer makes a final attempt to reveal the illogic of the
legal fiction upon which the plaintiff’s, and ultimately Justice Robert’s plurality opinion rests.
Justice Breyer: Now, the question from a constitutional point of view that you’re
being asked is how could that Constitution which says that this is intolerable, that
segregated school, and insists that the school boards in Swann and elsewhere take
black children and white children and integrate them? How could the Constitution
that day that that decree is removed tell the school board it cannot make that effort
any more, it can’t do what it’s been doing and we’ll send the children back to their
black schools and their white schools.
Id.
30
See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969
(2006); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1064–66 (2006); Kang, supra note 7, at 1493–95; Linda
Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit
Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1003–08 (2006); Krieger, supra note 20, at 1164–
65.
29
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role of the unconscious in discrimination. I express my gratitude for this
good work. However, I argue that, while this scholarship’s focus on the
mechanisms of cognitive categorization has taught us much about how
implicit bias works, it may have also undermined my project by turning
our attention away from the unique place that the ideology of white
supremacy holds in our conscious and unconscious beliefs. I find this
outcome unfortunate, if unintended, as the ubiquity and invidiousness of
racism was the central lesson of my article. I further express my fear that
cognitive psychology’s focus on the workings of the individual mind may
cause us to think of racism as a private concern, as if our private implicit
biases do not implicate collective responsibility for racial subordination
and the continued vitality of the ideology and material structures of white
supremacy. In its most extreme manifestation, this view of implicit bias,
as evidence only of private, individual beliefs, is expressed as a right to be
racist.31 Part III closes by noting a paradox. The Court’s use of legal
formalism to repress our consciousness of racism has converged with
psychologists’ efforts to explain the origins of unconscious bias, and this
convergence has served to undermine my article’s chief purpose: to
advance the understanding of racism as a societal disease and to argue that
the Constitution commands our collective responsibility for its cure.
II. THE ARTICLE’S ORIGINS: WHAT DID I HOPE TO DO?
I first met Professor Mari Matsuda32 in 1981 at a small gathering of
legal scholars of color at the University of Pennsylvania. I was presenting
a work in progress that contained the seeds of the argument that became
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection.33 Professor Matsuda recalls that, in
introducing that piece and explaining the process of its conception, I said,
“I write so I know I’m not crazy.” I do not remember saying this, but it is
surely true. I may have also said, “I hope that my writing will help other
people know that they are not crazy,” for that has also been a primary
motivation in my scholarship. I trace this motivation, and thus the origins
31
This seems to be the position taken by my colleague in this Symposium, Amy Wax, in her
article and in an op-ed published in the Wall Street Journal. Amy Wax, The Discriminating Mind:
Define It, Prove It, 40 CONN L. REV. 979 (2008); Amy Wax & Philip E. Tetlock, We Are All Racists At
Heart, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2005, at A16, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File.
32
Professor Matsuda and I have enjoyed a close professional and personal collaboration, having
co-authored two books, LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra note 7, MARI J. MATSUDA, CHARLES
LAWRENCE III, RICHARD DELGADO & KIMBERELE WILLIAMS CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND:
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993), and shared the
joys and challenges of a loving marriage and two beautiful children.
33
I first explored the ideas which eventually found voice in The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection, when writing a review of David Kirp’s book, JUST SCHOOLS: THE IDEA OF RACIAL
EQUALITY IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (1982). Charles R. Lawrence III, “Justice” or “Just Us”:
Racism and the Role of Ideology, 35 STAN. L. REV. 831, 841–43 (1983).
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of this article, to my experience in law school. I was one of only three
black students in my first year class, and I recall expending considerable
intellectual and emotional energy in an effort to maintain my sanity as I
struggled to make sense of a discursive world that rarely reflected my lived
experience. I did not have the work of Critical Race Theorists like Derrick
Bell, Kim Crenshaw, Patricia Williams, Jerry Lopez, and Mari Matsuda to
provide me with an analysis that explained the dissonance between that
lived experience and the way the dominant legal discourse described the
world.34 So I wrote to keep from going crazy, to explain to myself and
others why the legal analysis of race that my professors, and later my
colleagues, presented as wise and just often struck me as foolish or evil.
And, I wrote with the hope that in my own struggle to understand what was
making me crazy I might help all of us understand the insanity of white
supremacy.
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection was conceived in this struggle
for sanity. I knew from my own intuition and experience that racism
achieved its injury through the production and reproduction of hierarchy,
power, and material conditions of subordination determined by race. I
knew that this production of material and structural subordination is
achieved not only through coercion35 but also by the creation and
transmission of an ideology that justifies those coercive practices and
conditions. As Kendall Thomas has said, “We are raced.”36
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection began as a critique of
Washington v. Davis37 and of the doctrine of discriminatory purpose

34
Although I did not have the benefit of the work of critical race scholars in the legal academy, I
was taught and inspired by a host of critical race scholars including Herbert Aptheker, James Baldwin,
Gwendolyn Brooks, Harold Cruz, Martin Delany, Fredrick Douglas, W.E.B. Dubois, St. Clair Drake,
Frantz Fanon, John Hope Franklin, Lorraine Hansberry, Langston Hughes, Zora Niel Hurston,
Staughton Lynd, Martin King, Ira Ried, Paul Robeson, Walter Rodney, Carter G. Woodson, and
Malcolm X.
35
See Crenshaw, supra note 23, at 1369–87 (noting, in a section entitled “The Context Defined:
Racist Ideology and Hegemony,” that white supremacy is achieved not just through the internalization
of hegemonic ideology but also through coercive violence and economic subjugation); Ian F. Haney
López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV.
985, 1053 (2007) (“Racism and sexism gain social meaning and destructive power from the ubiquitous
deployment of force, violence, degradation, coercion, and dominance, not merely through the tendency
to make distinctions on the basis of criteria outside individual control.”).
36
Professor Kendall Thomas describes how racism acts as both speech and conduct. It is speech
in that it refers to a socially constructed idea or meaning derived from a history of oppression. It is
conduct in that it is perpetuated and reinforced through an ongoing process of contemporaneous speech
and acts. In this respect, racism is less a noun and more a verb. Thus, he says: “We are raced.”
Kendall Thomas, Nash Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for the Study of Law & Culture
at Columbia Law School, Comments at Panel on Critical Race Theory, Conference on Frontiers of
Legal Thought, Duke Law School (Jan. 26, 1990).
37
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–39 (1976).
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established in that decision. I joined many other critics of that decision
who condemned Davis for placing a heavy and often impossible burden on
plaintiffs seeking constitutional protection from racially discriminatory
practices and conditions.39 However, I wanted to make the more
fundamental argument that Davis was wrong because the injury of racial
inequality exists irrespective of the motives of the defendants in a
particular case. I believe that the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments
embody a moral and constitutional duty to act affirmatively to disestablish
the practices, institutional structures, and ideology of slavery and white
supremacy.40 I wanted to demonstrate that Davis’s motive-centered
inquiry, its requirement that we identify a perpetrator, a bad guy wearing a
white sheet and hood, made no sense if equality was our goal.
I also wanted to formulate a response to a question that I was asked by
white liberal friends whenever we talked about race. “Why should
‘innocent’ whites pay the costs for remedying racial discrimination for
which they were not responsible?” The question appeared in the
euphemisms of sophisticated anti-affirmative action arguments, in stories

38
The legal doctrine first established in Davis requires plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality
of a facially neutral law to prove a racially discriminatory purpose or intent on the part of those
responsible for the law’s enactment or administration. Davis, 426 U.S. at 240–41.
39
See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Foreword: Equal Employment Law and the Continuing Need for
Self-Help, 8 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 681, 682–83 (1977) (discussing the Davis test as “eroded to an
irreparable degree”); Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of
Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 39–40 (1977) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Davis “unwisely confine[d] heightened scrutiny”); Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62
MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1050, 1115–16 (1978) (commenting on the lack of validation of the test in Davis);
Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1, 49–50 (1977) (discussing the “purpose doctrine” in the context of race); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of
Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1989) (discussing the discriminatory purpose
requirement in Davis); Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial
Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 541, 543 (1977) (discussing the impact of the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Davis); Michael A. Reiter, Compensating for Race or National Origin in Employment
Testing, 8 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 687 (1977).
40
I have elsewhere described my view of this constitutional imperative:
My own theoretical framework and the discussion in this article presume that the
Reconstruction Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause embody a
constitutional norm or value of antisubordination. The meaning of this value can be
understood only in the context of a culture, nation, and Constitution that for more
than a century affirmatively embraced the values of slavery and white supremacy.
Thus, I believe the Equal Protection Clause does more than require that every
individual have equal access to the democratic process and does more than grant
blacks the right to treatment free of invidious racial motives. Rather, it creates a new
substantive value of “nonslavery” and antisubordination to replace the old values of
slavery and white supremacy.
Lawrence, supra note 16, at 1382; see also Charles R. Lawrence III, Race, Multiculturalism, and the
Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 824–25 (1995) (proposing racial equality as a
“substantive social condition rather than an individual right”).
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41

about a son who didn’t get into Harvard, of immigrant ancestors who had
never owned slaves,42 and in less refined outbursts like, “Some of my best
friends are black,” but I always heard the question’s meaning loud and
clear. My friends were saying, “Why me? I’m not a racist.”
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, I had participated in a newly militant
civil rights movement that called for structural and institutional changes
that went beyond formal equality and addressed the social and economic
conditions of poor people of color. We used words like white supremacy,
institutional racism, and colonialism to name these conditions.43 By the
time I was writing The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, the backlash
41
These arguments have found their way into legal doctrine as well. For example, in Regents of
Univ. of California v. Bakke, the Supreme Court said that the harm of “societal discrimination” is too
“amorphous” for there to be a remedy. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307
(1978) (“That goal was far more focused than the remedying of the effects of ‘societal discrimination,’
an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past.”); see also City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989) (“Like the claim that discrimination in primary
and secondary schooling justifies a rigid racial preference in medical school admissions, an amorphous
claim that there has been past discrimination in a particular industry cannot justify the use of an
unyielding racial quota.”). The Court also rejected the notion that the “innocent,” or those not found to
have perpetrated racial discrimination, should be disadvantaged because of past discrimination
perpetrated by others. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (“We have never approved a classification that aids
persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent
individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or
statutory violations.”); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974) (“Disparate treatment of white
and Negro students occurred within the Detroit school system, and not elsewhere, and on this record
the remedy must be limited to that system.”).
42
These arguments reflected an emerging narrative which transformed the discussion from a civil
rights story linked to slavery to a story about competing racial and ethnic groups. See Haney López,
supra note 34, at 990 (“This competing narrative suggested that racial subordination was largely past
and that social inequalities, if any, reflected the cultural failings of minorities themselves, while further
postulating that there existed no dominant white race as such, but instead only a welter of competing
cultural groups defined in national origin terms, for instance, Irish- or Italian-Americans.”); Bakke, 438
U.S. at 292 (“[T]he United States had become a Nation of minorities. Each had to struggle—and to
some extent struggles still—to overcome the prejudices not of a monolithic majority, but of a
‘majority’ composed of various minority groups of whom it was said—perhaps unfairly in many
cases—that a shared characteristic was a willingness to disadvantage other groups.”). The story about a
“nation of minorities” became an attractive historical revision to a majority looking to assuage its guilt
and avoid penance. See JOEL DREYFUSS & CHARLES LAWRENCE III, THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS
OF INEQUALITY 157, 209–10 (1979); see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 402 (“[I]t is more than a little ironic
that, after several hundred years of class-based discrimination against Negroes, the Court is unwilling
to hold that a class-based remedy for that discrimination is permissible.”) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
43
For a history of this movement and examples of this discourse, see generally VOICES OF
FREEDOM, AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 349–586 (Henry Hampton and Steve
Fayer eds. 1990); HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 433–459 (1980);
ROBERT L. ALLEN, BLACK AWAKENING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA: AN ANALYTIC HISTORY 1–3 (1969);
STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION (1967);
MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION AND BEYOND
IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945–2006 (3d ed. 2007); JULIUS LESTER, LOOK OUT, WHITEY! BLACK POWER’ S
GON’ GET YOUR MAMA! xi–xii (1968); THE BLACK POWER REVOLT 10 (Floyd B. Barbour ed. 1968);
MALCOLM X, MALCOLM X SPEAKS (1965).
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against Black power and Black Nationalism was in full sway. My white
liberal friends were saying, in effect, “I’m tired of being called a ‘white
honky.’ I just don’t like being called a racist.” I understood the intent of
this request that I not defame them with the same pejorative label I would
use to describe a Nazi or KKK member, and that I reaffirm our friendship
by acknowledging that we both stood against racism. I always felt
conflicted at this point in the conversation. I wanted to respond positively
to their good faith commitment to racial equality, but I had also heard in
their plea for a “good white folks” pass a demand that I do something more
than not call them a bad person. They were asking me to delete the words
“white supremacy” from our conversation, to take the question of our
collective racism off the table, to refrain from asking whether their white
privilege implicated them in the structures and conditions of racial
inequality, to exempt them from responsibility for America’s racism. This
I could not do.
My answer to this dilemma was to refuse to issue “good white folks”
passes, to say, “Sorry, my friend. You are a racist and so am I.” The chief
insight of The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection was gained from my
realization that I could not respond to my friends’ first request (that I
refrain from calling them racist) without also giving them a pass on the
second request—to remove from the agenda the issue of our implication in
America’s racism. I understood that the second request was necessarily
contained within the first. They wanted a pass on their own racism and on
their participation in America’s racism as well. When my friends said they
didn’t want to be called racist, they were also saying they didn’t want to be
held responsible for society’s institutional and structural racism.
The defendant in Washington v. Davis had asked the Supreme Court
for the same free pass on racism as my friends had asked of me. And, of
course, the Court gave the defendants that free “good guy” pass on both
questions.
Only intentional racists were deemed to violate the
constitutional value of racial equality. But the Court, in Davis, did much
more than give the named defendants a free pass. It held that, because the
defendants were not intentional racists, no constitutional violation had
occurred, even though the facts showed dramatic racial inequality.45 The
rest of us were held guiltless as well, all of us exculpated from any
responsibility for society’s institutional and structural racism, because no
44
For a discussion of the backlash against black militancy of this period, see DREYFUSS &
LAWRENCE, supra note 42, at 141–61, and STEPHEN STEINBERG, TURNING BACK: THE RETREAT FROM
RACIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 97–175 (1995).
45
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976) (“[W]e have difficulty understanding how
a law establishing a racially neutral qualification for employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory
and denies ‘any person . . . equal protection of the laws’ simply because a greater proportion of
Negroes fail to qualify than members of other racial or ethnic groups.”).

2008]

UNCONSCIOUS RACISM REVISITED

947

intentional racist planned the unequal result. While blacks continued to
suffer from conditions of inequality, none of us were to blame.46
My goal in The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection was to expose and
challenge the way that the Court had, with this single opinion, declared the
reconstructive work of the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments accomplished.
The Supreme Court, by conflating the issue of bad motive with that of
constitutional and moral injury, had given my friends and colleagues the
exoneration they were seeking from me. I wrote The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection to say to my friends, “Just because the Court gave you
the answer you wanted to hear doesn’t mean it’s a good answer. Just
because the Court’s answer has let you off the hook, do not think that you
can claim allegiance to the struggle against racism.”
My method was to decouple the question of whether my friends were
good or bad people from the question of our responsibility for our own
racism. I argued that if the Equal Protection Clause prohibited government
decisions determined or influenced by our continued adherence to an
ideology of white supremacy, then Davis had created a false dichotomy
between the “evil” acts of avowed racial bigots and the “innocent” acts of
good people. If the constitutional value at stake is anti-slavery or antiwhite supremacy, then that value is violated whenever a decision is
determined by our belief in white supremacy. And if the decisions of the
avowed racial bigot and my good white friends were all influenced by our
belief in white supremacy, the presence or absence of bad intent was
irrelevant to the question of whether those decisions violated the Equal
Protection Clause.47
The final piece of my argument, that bad intent and constitutional
injury must be decoupled, asserted the ubiquity of racist belief and the fact
that often we are not even conscious of the fact that we hold those beliefs.
In the most often quoted passage of the article I said, “[A]mericans share a
historical experience that has resulted in individuals within the culture
46
This places the Court’s jurisprudence firmly within what Alan Freeman calls the “perpetrator
perspective,” which holds that the goal of antidiscrimination law is to root out individual instances of
discrimination in a world otherwise free from discrimination. This perspective “denies historical
reality—in particular, the fact that we would not have had antidiscrimination law had it not been for the
historical oppression of particular races.” Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law from 1954 to 1989:
Uncertainty, Contradiction, Rationalization, Denial, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 288 (David Kairys ed.
3d ed. 1998). In contrast, the “victim perspective” focuses on the social and economic conditions
associated with our specific history of discrimination and measures the success of antidiscrimination
law against the actual equality it produces. Id. at 285–311; Freeman, supra note 39, at 1050–52.
47
I recognize, as I did then, that my choice to center my argument on the influence of the
unconscious on an individual’s decision-making meant that I was accepting the Court’s motivecentered inquiry, albeit for the limited purposes of engaging my friends and colleagues within the
dominant legal paradigm and proving Davis’s intent doctrine incoherent on its own terms. For a
discussion of my motivations for and ambivalence about this choice, see infra notes 52–55 and
accompanying text.
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ubiquitously attaching a significance to race that is irrational and often
outside their awareness.”48
In support of this assertion, I turned to the considerable body of theory
and research in psychology and social science that hypothesized and
offered evidence for the presence of perceptions, beliefs, and ideas of
which we are unaware but, nonetheless, influence our actions and
decisions. I devoted a significant part of the article to introduce these
disciplines to an audience that had paid scant attention to their implications
for constitutional theory,49 and it is for this part of my argument that the
article is most often cited.50
I asked my readers to think of America’s racism as a public health
problem, as a disease that required anti-racists to adopt the mindset and
methodology of epidemiologists rather than that of policemen.51 I hoped
that by pointing out that we were all infected with racism I would at least
remove the very stigma that caused my friends to deny their racism, and at
the same time help them recognize that the injury of racism was found in
symptomatic material conditions, including inequalities of wealth,
employment, schooling, health, incarceration, etc., and in the ideology that
produced and justified those symptomatic material conditions.
I had another purpose that shaped the content and form of the article. I
was determined to challenge the Supreme Court and proponents of the
discriminatory purpose requirement on their own terms. I wanted to prove
that my argument against the discriminatory intent requirement did not
require agreement with my more radical position that the Fourteenth
Amendment embodies a constitutional norm or value of anti-subordination,
to demonstrate that, even if we judged the Davis doctrine by the measure
of mainstream liberal theories of equal protection, the doctrine did not
serve the Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose. I devoted a significant
segment of the article to this task, examining two leading constitutional
theories that justified the application of heightened scrutiny to
48
Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 327. Justice Brennan quotes
this passage in full in the body of his dissent in McCleskey v. Kemp. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 360 n.13 (Blackman, J., dissenting) (citing generally
to Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 7). I think that I can safely say Justice
Brennan’s quote brought attention to my Article that it might not have otherwise received.
49
Part I of The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection was subtitled, “A Primer on the Unconscious
and Race.” Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 328.
50
See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law,
94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2006) (“In an influential article published in 1987, Professor Charles Lawrence
urged the legal system to ‘reckon[] with unconscious racism.’ His article relied on both Freudian
psychoanalytic theory and the findings of cognitive psychologists to argue that unconscious bias is a
pervasive aspect of everyday life.”).
51
See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 331 (“We must
understand that our entire culture is afflicted, and we must take cognizance of psychological theory in
order to frame a legal theory that can address that affliction.”).
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governmental decisions based on race, (the “process defect theory” and the
“stigma theory”), and arguing that the distinct harm that each theory posits
is more completely revealed and addressed if the theory incorporates a
recognition of unconscious as well as conscious motives for racist acts.52
Because each of these theories assumed that the harm of race
discrimination derived from intentional motive, I challenged the theories
by asking that they not ignore what science had taught us about the
influence of the unconscious on human motivation.53 My proposal here
was quite modest: rather than arguing that the harm of racism existed
irrespective of motivation, I chose to speak within the motivational
paradigm of the dominant liberal constitutional theory. As a law professor
writing for a law review, it seemed the most effective way to be heard.
However, my choice to engage liberal legal theory on its own terms is
often incorrectly read to infer my acceptance of the normative principle
and interpretation of the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause upon
which that theory is premised.54 Both Ely’s process defect theory and
52
Briefly stated, process defect theory takes the position that judicial review of legislative action
is legitimate insofar as it seeks to reinforce democratic values by correcting defects in the political
process. See id. at 345–49 (giving an overview of the theory); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 76 (1980) (“[I]t is an appropriate function of the Court
to keep the machinery of the democratic government running as it should, to make sure the channels of
political participation are kept open.”). John Hart Ely, a chief proponent of this theory, notes that racial
discrimination is one manner in which the political process gets distorted. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 346. The courts, however, only look for a process defect and
apply strict scrutiny when a legislature makes a facial racial classification or when overt racism has
been proved under the Davis test. Id. at 347. This completely ignores the destructive effect of
unconscious racism on the political process. Thus, in The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, I argue
that Ely’s process defect theory “stops an important step short of locating and eliminating the defect it
has identified.” Id. at 349. Stigma theory likewise attaches undue significance to the distinction
between conscious and unconscious racism. Stigma theory posits that racial classifications should be
strictly scrutinized when they serve to shame and degrade a class of persons as inferior. Id. at 349–50.
This was at the heart of the Court’s unanimous decision in Brown holding that segregated schools are
inherently unequal. Id. at 350. The injury inflicted by stigmatization flows from the meaning society
attaches to an action or classification. Thus, the evil racist intent of individual actors, although perhaps
sufficient, is certainly not necessary to inflict the harm of stigma. Nonetheless, as I note in The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection, many advocates and scholars who embrace stigma theory have been
extremely hesitant to suggest expanding equal protection analysis much beyond laws which are
apparently race-dependent. Id. at 353–54.
53
See Krieger, supra note 19, at 1164 n.11 (“Drawing on psychoanalytic theory, Professor
Lawrence argues that much of what is classified as disparate treatment results from subconscious
instincts and motivations.”).
54
See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original
Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 91–92 (“[Charles Lawrence] attempted to cast his argument in the
shadow of the arguments by traditional liberals, such as John Hart Ely and Paul Brest, and to respond to
the more radical arguments of Alan Freeman. However, his efforts to tie his worldview into the
liberals’ critiques of current court and legal dogma fail precisely because these critiques ultimately take
for granted the perspective of the white world.”). Legal scholars such as Linda Krieger and Jerry Kang
have described their work as building on my own and distinguished my work from their own primarily
by my emphasis on psychoanalytic rather than cognitive theory. To the extent that their work adopts
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Brest’s anti-stigmatization thesis ascribe to the Equal Protection Clause a
principle that disfavors race-dependant conduct. The argument for
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to embrace this principle requires
that one identify a substantive value that explains why race-dependent
political choices violate the principle and race-neutral choices do not. Ely,
Brest, and the justices in Washington v. Davis find that substantive value in
the antidiscrimination principle which they read as a value against conduct
infected by prejudice or bias. Simply put, this principle finds a normative
wrong in conduct motivated by prejudice toward a racial group.
I challenged the Davis intent requirement and the internal coherency of
these theories by arguing that they only accounted for conscious prejudice,
and that unconscious motives were also a source of this wrong. I believe I
succeeded in this challenge. But my desire to prove Davis incoherent on
its own terms and to frame my argument so that my colleagues would find
it more accessible and acceptable undermined my initial and primary
purpose.
My own view of equal protection’s central principle and command is
very different from that which finds the harm to equality in the mind and
motivation of individuals. I believe the Equal Protection Clause embodies
a constitutional norm or value of anti-subordination.55 In recent years I
have stated this belief more forthrightly and with more clarity than I did in
1987. For example, in Forbidden Conversations I write:
My own theoretical framework and the discussion in this
article presume that the Reconstruction Amendments and the
Equal Protection Clause embody a constitutional norm or
value of anti-subordination. The meaning of this value can
be understood only in the context of a culture, nation, and
Constitution that for more than a century affirmatively
embraced the values of slavery and white supremacy. Thus, I
believe the Equal Protection Clause does more than require
that every individual have equal access to the democratic
process and does more than grant blacks the right to
treatment free of invidious racial motives. Rather, it creates a
new substantive value of “non-slavery” and antithe liberal paradigm, they have also read me to implicitly accept the dominant white worldview. See
Kang, supra note 7; Krieger, supra note 22. For an expanded discussion of how legal scholars
employing cognitive theory remain within the dominant liberal legal paradigm see infra notes 83–111
and accompanying text.
55
See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other’s Harvest: Diversity’s Deeper Meaning, 31
U.S.F. L. REV. 757, 775–78 (1997) (explaining the necessity of interracial collaboration in achieving
anti-subordination); Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go, supra note 7; Charles R. Lawrence III, Two
Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928,
950–51, 962 (2001) (defining and defending anti-subordination theory as indispensable to individual
equality and dignity).
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subordination to replace the old values of slavery and white
supremacy. Given the historical and cultural context of the
Amendments’ adoption, I believe the Constitution cannot be
understood to establish these new values but not implement
them. Such a reading renders the Amendments without
substance. If the Reconstruction Amendments replace the
constitutional value of slavery with the value of non-slavery,
the Equal Protection Clause requires the disestablishment of
the ideology, laws, practices, and structures that were put in
place in service of slavery and white supremacy. It requires a
reconstruction of the substantive societal conditions that
slavery created.56
In The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, I spoke of the “cultural
meaning” of an allegedly racially discriminatory act as the “best available
analogue for and evidence of the collective unconscious that we cannot
observe directly.”57 My reference to the “collective unconscious” rather
than the individual actor’s unconscious was meant to convey my belief that
the harm resided in the continued existence of a widely shared belief in
white supremacy and not in the motivation of the individual actor or actors
charged with discrimination. So long as this shared ideology remains we
must assume that the affirmative command of the Constitution’s Equal
Protection Clause to abolish white supremacy has not been accomplished.
In retrospect, I believe that while my effort to demonstrate the
limitations of Davis on its own terms may have advanced the utility of the
article for litigators and teachers of traditional constitutional theory, it also
may have undermined the central goal of my project.58
III. WHAT HAVE THEY DONE WITH MY SONG?:
TWO RESPONSES TO THE ARTICLE
A. Racism Repressed: The Supreme Court as Societal Super Ego
When I wrote The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, I was not so
naïve that I expected I would persuade the Court to recognize the error of
its ways and reject the Davis intent requirement in a subsequent case. It
was apparent to me, even then, that the Court was declaring its intention to
56

Lawrence, supra note 16, at 1382–83.
Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 324.
58
In my own defense, I must point out that even in 1987, I recognized this tension between the
liberal frame I adopted in this Part of the Article and my own view and spoke of it in the last Part of the
Article. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 381–87; see Culp, supra
note 54, at 47–48 (“Black scholars knew, in exactly the way the black domestic did, that certain claims
were outside the bounds of discourse. . . . Black legal scholars have faced a history of not being heard,
or of being heard selectively.”).
57
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retreat as quickly as possible from the radical reasoning of Green v. County
School Board of New Kent County59 and Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,60
cases that acknowledged the still vital legacy of slavery and Jim Crow and
recognized that justice required the affirmative disestablishment of the
institutions and structures of white supremacy.61 For the Court to heed my
call for attention to the cultural meaning of racially discriminatory acts
would require its adherence to the substantive vision of racial justice set
out in Green and Griggs. The Court had made an about face in Davis. It
would stage a rapid and relentless retreat from the fight against white
supremacy,62 and that retreat required the Justices to blind themselves and
us to the racial meaning of our acts.
The progress of this march away from racial meaning is most evident
in the affirmative action cases, but it begins in Washington v. Davis itself.
Justice White’s opinion for the majority in Davis argues that the Court
must require proof of intentional racism before applying strict scrutiny
because an impact test would prove unworkable. He argues that an impact
test would be “far reaching”63 and might require the court to “invalidate a
whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing
statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black
than the more affluent white.”64 In other words, we cannot subject every
governmental action with disproportionate impact to strict scrutiny,
because many of these actions are not the product of racism.
But why not require strict scrutiny of just those cases where the harm
can be traced to white supremacy’s continuing presence? Justice White
offers no explicit answer to this question, but the answer his argument
implies is clear: “Because we cannot tell when racism is at work and when
it is not.” What follows from Justice White’s assertion that we cannot
know racism when we see it is Davis’s doctrinal rule that we may only
treat racially discriminatory conditions and outcomes with suspicion when
59
See Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, Va., 391 U.S. 430, 437–38 (1968)
(“School boards such as the respondent then operating state-compelled dual systems were nevertheless
clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a
unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.”) (emphasis
added); see also Lawrence, supra note 5, at 34–40 (discussing the importance of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Green).
60
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (“[G]ood intent or absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as
‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.”).
61
See Freeman, supra note 39, at 1093 (noting that “Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court’s first
substantive decision under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, is as close as the Court has ever
come to formally adopting the victim perspective”).
62
See generally id. at 1114–17; see also Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV.
1971, 1987–89 (1990).
63
Davis, 426 U.S. at 248.
64
Id.
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government actors employ racial classifications on the face of a statute or
when plaintiffs prove those actors intended to achieve a racial result.
Accordingly, it is the use of racial classification, or attention to race, not its
connection to white supremacy, that the court finds suspicious. Justice
White explains his decision to not strictly scrutinize actions with racially
discriminatory impact by claiming he cannot tell whether they are racist or
not, and then holds that the Court must strictly scrutinize all facially racial
classifications without asking whether we have any reason to believe they
are racist in intent. In both cases, the Court declines to ask the question,
“Does the government action reinforce the structures and ideology of white
supremacy?” In The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, I condemned
Washington v. Davis for the Court’s refusal to consider the racial meaning
of discriminatory impact, but Davis also marks the beginning of a series of
cases that assert and establish as doctrine the incoherent, unprincipled,
Orwellian notion that the Fourteenth Amendment mandates equality but
prohibits consideration of the presence or absence of white supremacy.
Although I argue in The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection that we are
often unaware of the racism that motivates our actions, the Supreme Court
majority’s refusal to see society’s racism is quite intentional. In
McCleskey v. Kemp, a case decided within months of the publication of my
article, the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to the
administration of Georgia’s death penalty statute.65 Plaintiff had proffered
a statistical analysis of the sentences in more than two thousand murder
cases that demonstrated that defendants charged with killing whites were
4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with
killing blacks.66 Although Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
acknowledged the validity of plaintiff’s regression analysis demonstrating
the statistical disparity could be explained by no other factor than racial
bias,67 the Court nonetheless said it could not see race at work. “[W]e
decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious,” said Justice
Powell.68 In Davis, Justice White argues that the Court must require intent
because it cannot tell when discriminatory impact is caused by racial bias.
In McCleskey the Court simply “declines” to do so. “There is some risk of
racial prejudice influencing a jury’s decision in a criminal case,” says the
Court, “the question is at what point that risk becomes constitutionally
unacceptable.”69 A friend of mine who represents defendants in death
65

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
See id. at 286–87 (“McCleskey proffered a statistical study performed by Professors David C.
Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth (the Baldus study) . . . . One of his models concludes
that, even after taking account of 39 nonracial variables, defendants charged with killing white victims
were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks.”).
67
Id. at 291 n.7.
68
Id. at 313.
69
Id. at 308–09.
66
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penalty cases calls McCleskey the “so what” case. The Court says, “OK,
so you’ve shown that more likely than not this defendant’s death sentence
was influenced by racial prejudice. So what?”
Regents v. Bakke marks the first case where Justice White’s argument
for intent in Davis (that we must require proof of intent because we cannot
tell when discriminatory impact implicates racism) appears together with
its doctrinal fraternal twin (that we must strictly scrutinize even remedial
racial classifications because how else will we know that they are not
invidious).
In Bakke, Justice Powell rejects the remedial purpose of ameliorating
“societal discrimination.”70 “It’s too ‘amorphous,’”71 he says. What is it
that makes amorphous discrimination inappropriate for remedy? Powell
cannot mean that we should not seek to remedy societal discrimination
because there is too much racism or because it is too widespread. No,
Justice Powell declares “societal discrimination” is off limits for raceconscious remedy for the same reason that Justice White refuses to
recognize racism in racially discriminatory impact.72 His claim is that he
can’t be sure it’s racism.73 Moreover, the Court holds in Bakke that all
laws that employ racial classifications on their face must be strictly
scrutinized. Why? The Court’s answer in Bakke, Croson, Adarand,
Gruter and PICS is the same: because we cannot tell if this racial
classification is invidious or benign. We do not know whether it is
employed for good or bad reasons.74
Note that in Davis uncertainty about the cause of racially subordinating
impact leads to the default position of no suspicion of racism. In the
affirmative action and recent desegregation cases, uncertainty about the
motives of those attempting to remedy racial subordination leads to the
default position of suspicion of racism. I think I have already made it clear
that I do not buy the Court majority’s claim to myopia. To paraphrase
70

Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309 (1978).
Id. at 307.
72
Id. at 310.
73
Id. at 307–10.
74
See id. at 298 (“[I]t may not always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign.”); see
also PICS, 127 S.Ct. at 2764 (“Our cases clearly reject the argument that motives affect the strict
scrutiny analysis.”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“‘Absent searching judicial inquiry
into the justification for such race-based measures,’ we have no way to determine what ‘classifications
are benign or remedial and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial
inferiority or simple racial politics.’”) (quoting City of Richmonds v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493 (1989)); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (“We adhere to that view today,
despite the surface appeal of holding ‘benign’ racial classifications to a lower standard, because ‘it may
not always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign.’”) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298);
Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (“Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based
measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and
what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics.”).
71
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75

Justice Stevens’s words in Adarand, I think Justice O’Connor and her
colleagues really do know the difference between a “keep out sign” and a
“welcome mat.”76
But I want to point out something even more disturbing about the
move the Court has made in these cases. By claiming not to be able to
know when racism or white supremacy is at work, they have removed the
question of white supremacy’s presence from the doctrine that applies the
Equal Protection Clause to questions of race. The Court presumes a law
that produces discriminatory impacts is benign without ever asking
whether that discriminatory impact furthers white supremacy. Facially
racial classifications are presumed invidious, again without asking whether
the classification perpetuates white supremacy or operates to disestablish
American Apartheid. We have the 14th Amendment only because we had
slavery and a war that ended slavery. The origin is anti-racist, the Court’s
interpretation is not.
The recent decision striking down school desegregation plans in
Seattle and Kentucky77 represents the culmination and nadir of this ruthless
march away from my call to recognize the cultural meaning of government
action as a way of discovering whether that action represents the
continuing influence of white supremacy. Only in a world where racial
discrimination is devoid of any meaning can Justice Roberts equate the
segregation in Brown78 with the integration in PICS.79 When Justice
Roberts says, “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to
stop discriminating on the basis of race,”80 he asks us to deny our
knowledge of the real meaning of race and racism in America. He asks us
to repress our knowledge of 380 years of slavery and segregation. He asks
us to believe that race consciousness is what violates the Constitution, not
racism.

75

Adarand, 515 U.S. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens found “untenable” Justice O’Connor’s assumption that there is no consistent
way to distinguish between racial classifications which place a burden on a minority race and those
which seek to bestow a benefit or those which are invidious and those which are benign. See id. at 243.
Indeed, as Justice Stevens explains, Justice O’Connor’s position runs contrary to common sense. See
id. at 245 (“It would treat a Dixiecrat Senator’s decision to vote against Thurgood Marshall’s
confirmation in order to keep African-Americans off the Supreme Court as on a par with President
Johnson’s evaluation of his nominee’s race as a positive factor. It would equate a law that made black
citizens ineligible for military service with a program aimed at recruiting black soldiers.”).
Consequently, Justice Stevens quips that “[t]he consistency that the Court espouses would disregard the
difference between a ‘No Trespassing’ sign and a welcome mat.” Id.
77
PICS, 127 S.Ct. at 2738.
78
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
79
PICS, 127 S.Ct. at 2738.
80
Id. at 2768.
76
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B. A Two-Edged Sword: The Emerging Science of Implicit Bias
During the twenty years since The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection
was published, behavioral scientists have made significant advances in the
study of unconscious racism. Recent social cognition research has
provided stunning evidence to support my assertion that we are all infected
with racial bias and that often that bias resides outside of our awareness.81
In 1994, researchers at Yale University and the University of
Washington devised the Implicit Association Test.82 The Implicit
Association Test measures unconscious racial bias by linking together
words and images to reveal what associations come most easily to mind.
When you visit the IAT web site, you are asked to classify a series of faces
into two categories, African American and European American. You must
then mentally associate the white and black faces with words such as “joy”
and “failure.”83 You must take the test under considerable time pressure
81
For an overview of this body of scientific research and theory, see generally Anthony
Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945
(2006). See also Anthony Greenwald et al., A Unified Theory of Implicit Attitudes, Stereotypes, SelfEsteem, and Self-Concept, 109 PSYCHOL REV. 3 (2002); Anthony Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji,
Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995).
82
The IAT was developed by Dr. Mahzarin Banaji, now at Harvard University, and Dr. Anthony
Greenwald of the University of Washington and their colleagues. See Shankar Vedantam, See No Bias,
WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2005, at W12, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File; Erica Goode, A
Computer Diagnosis of Prejudice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, at F7, available at LEXIS, News
Library, NYT File; Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes,
Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring
Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998).
83
Greenwald and Krieger describe the mechanics of the test:
The most widely used IAT measure assesses implicit attitudes toward African
Americans (AA) relative to European Americans (EA). In this “Race IAT,”
respondents first practice distinguishing AA from EA faces by responding to faces
from one of these two categories with the press of a computer key on the left side of
the keyboard and to those of the other category with a key on the right side of the
keyboard. Respondents next practice distinguishing pleasant-meaning from
unpleasant-meaning words in a similar manner. The next two tasks, given in a
randomly determined order, use all four categories (AA faces, EA faces, pleasantmeaning words, and unpleasant-meaning words). In one of these two tasks, the IAT
calls for one response (say, pressing a left-side key) when the respondent sees AA
faces or pleasant words, whereas EA faces and unpleasant words call for the other
response (right-side key). In the remaining task, EA faces share a response with
pleasant words and AA faces with unpleasant words.
The implicit-attitude measure produced by this IAT is based on relative speeds of
responding in the two four-category tasks. This measure allows an inference about
attitudes (category-valence associations) because it is easier to give the same
response to items from two categories when those two categories are cognitively
associated with each other. For American respondents taking the Race IAT,
response speeds are often faster when EA, rather than AA, is paired with pleasant
words. This frequently observed pattern supports the interpretation that EA-pleasant
is a stronger association than AA-pleasant. Researchers have described this result as
showing implicit attitudinal preference for EA relative to AA.
Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 81, at 952–53.
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using your computer keys to respond to the pairings. If you take the test
too slowly the web site indicates that you have defaulted and must begin
the test again. These tests have been taken by more than two million
people. An analysis of tens of thousands of these tests taken anonymously
on the Harvard web site found that eighty-eight percent of white people
had a pro-white or anti-black implicit bias; nearly eighty-three percent of
heterosexuals showed implicit bias for straight people over gays and
lesbians; and more than two-thirds of non-Arab, non-Muslim testers
displayed implicit biases against Arab Muslims.84
Implicit bias research also supports my observation that the victims of
white supremacy often internalize racial bias directed against them. Fortyeight percent of blacks showed a pro-white or anti-black bias. Claude
Steele’s groundbreaking research on stereotype threat provides more
evidence of the debilitating effects of internalized racism on even high
In a striking adaptation of Steele’s
achieving black students.85
experiments, researchers at Harvard found that Asian women math majors
performed better on math tests when they were prompted to think of
themselves as Asian and worse when they thought of themselves as
women.86
This cognitive research has also shown that implicit bias against
African Americans and Arabs predicts policy preferences on affirmative
action and racial profiling.87 This suggests that implicit attitudes affect
84

Vedantam, supra note 82.
Psychologist Claude Steel describes the “stereotype threat” as a fear that by performing poorly
on exams minority students risk reinforcing negative racial stereotypes associated with race and
intelligence. The deployment of these racial stereotypes creates self-doubt and results in lower test
scores. Thus, the stereotypes become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Claude Steel, Thin Ice: “Stereotype
Threat” and Black College Students, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1999, at 44; Claude M. Steele, A
Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 613, 613–18, 620–22 (1997); Claude Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and
the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797,
797–98, 800–01, 805–06, 808 (1995); see also Thomas Healy, Stigmatic Harm and Standing, 92 IOWA
L. REV. 417, 456–57 (2007) (summarizing one of Steel’s studies demonstrating this phenomenon with
black students).
86
Social psychologist Margaret Shih had three groups of Asian American women at Harvard
University fill out different questionnaires designed to be subtly suggestive of different social identities
(i.e., female or Asian). The subjects were then asked to take a math test. Those given the questionnaire
triggering an Asian identity performed best; the control group came in second; and the group given the
female identity questionnaire last. In other words, having the Asian identity triggered boosted
performance whereas cuing the female identity lowered scores. Kang, supra note 7, at 1492–93, 1521–
22; Margaret Shih et al., Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in Quantitative
Performance, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 80, 80–83 (1999).
87
See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1065–66 (2006) (stating that the presence of implicit bias
creates discrimination by causing merit to be mismeasured); see also Vedantam, supra note 82
(explaining that “bias against blacks and Arabs predicts policy preferences on affirmative action and
racial profiling”).
85
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more than personal preference or snap judgments. They also play a role in
positions arrived at after careful consideration such as the policy choices of
legislators, policemen, and employers.88
Legal scholars, including Linda Krieger, Jerry Kang, Richard Banks,
Devon Carbado, Mitu Gulati, and Cass Sunstein, have explored the
implications of this new science for the adjudication of allegations of
discrimination, for shaping public policy and for understanding broader
patterns of disadvantage in our society.89 Linda Hamilton Krieger’s
groundbreaking article, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment, introduced the
science of cognitive bias to employment discrimination lawyers,
demonstrating that a large number of biased employment decisions result
not from discriminatory motivation (either conscious or unconscious) but
from unintentional categorization-related judgment errors.90 This scholarly
work has in turn been employed by lawyers who have educated judges
about unconscious bias even as they have argued anti-discrimination cases
within the limited doctrinal regimes that focus on motive rather than
impact,91 and by advocates who have sought directly to educate employers,
educators, health care workers, and political constituencies about the
importance of recognizing unconscious racism in the fight for equal
justice.92
I welcome and celebrate this important work. When I first assigned
88

Krieger, supra note 20, at 1169–70, 1173, 1177, 1181–82, 1200–01, 1210.
R. Richard Banks, Discrimination and Implicit Bias In A Racially Unequal Society, 94 CAL. L.
REV. 1169, 1170–71 (2006); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 701–04 (2001); Devon Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1260–62, 1267–70 (2000); Kang, supra note 7, at 1491–95; Krieger, supra
note 20, at 1165.
90
Krieger, supra note 20, at 1165.
91
To date The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection has been cited in sixteen judicial decisions,
including one United States Supreme Court case, five decisions of the federal Courts of Appeals, eight
federal district court cases, and by the state supreme courts of Alaska and Minnesota. These citations
have covered a broad range of cases and legal issues, including: criminal law, see McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 332–33 (1987), U.S. v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 827–28 (9th Cir. 1992); Chin v. Runnels,
343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2004); U.S. v. Burroughs, 897 F. Supp. 205, 208 (E.D. Pa. 1995);
United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 779 n.25 (E.D. Mo. 1994); Knop v. Johnson, 667 F. Supp.
467, 503 (W.D. Mich. 1987); Alaska Inter-Tribal Council v. State, 110 P.3d 947, 963 n.62 (Alaska
2005); Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 575 n.1 (Minn. 1994); education, see
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 892 F.2d 851, 863 n.28 (10th Cir. 1989); employment discrimination, see
Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 61 (1st Cir. 1999); Thomas v. Troy City Bd. of Educ.,
302 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (M. D. Ala. 2004); Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., 1 F. Supp. 2d
783, 801 (M.D. Tenn. 1998); Harris v. Int’l Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515–16 (D. Me. 1991); and
immigration, see Gonzalez-Rivera v. I.N.S., 22 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1994).
92
See, e.g., Equal Justice Society, EJS and California Teachers Association Collaboration on
Unconscious Bias Project, http://www.equaljusticesociety.org/newsletter5/story5.html (last visited Apr.
1, 2008) (discussing the pilot Project in Davis, California that will review “current research of
unconscious bias in education and . . . any current research on [the] impact of bias within the
classroom” and conduct “‘collaborative inquiry project’ within the Davis School Community”).
89
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The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection to my constitutional law classes,
many students found my claim that we all harbored unconscious bias
difficult to accept. They found the theoretical work and anecdotal
examples I cited unconvincing and argued that if my own experience
differed from theirs this was indicative of the considerable difference in
our ages. They were careful not to call me old, but they said that they had
grown up in a post-civil rights world where race no longer mattered. I was
disappointed but not surprised by this reaction. After all, for these young
people the “colored” and “white” signs on drinking fountains I saw as a
child were ancient history. This post-Bakke generation was raised on a
steady diet of the carefully selected excerpts from Dr. King’s “I have a
dream” speech. When I kidded them by referring to them as “white folks,”
expressions of surprise and betrayal crossed their faces because I’d noticed
their race and said it out loud. Now when I teach Washington v. Davis93 I
include a link to the IAT site94 alongside the link to my article. Although
my students may claim the test is unfair or poorly constructed, the
scholarly literature proves the methodology unimpeachable and they must
directly confront the proof of their own unacknowledged bias. Part I of
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, subtitled “A Primer on the
Unconscious and Race,” would look very different were it written today.
If the court victories relying on the cognitive research have been limited
and sometimes overruled, the beneficial influence of this important work
on policy and political discourse is far from trivial. If my article in some
small way inspired this work or paved the way for its application to antidiscrimination law, I can count myself as having contributed to something
good.
But there is also something that troubles me about the way the research
and scholarship of behavioral scientists describes and explains unconscious
racism. Even as this science has done much to establish, prove, and
quantify the presence of individual unconscious bias, it has also served to
undermine the central purpose of my article. Recall that my first goal for
this project was to put the subject of racism as white supremacy back on
the table and to argue that our collective belief in white supremacy and the
continuing influence of that belief on government policy and decisions
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s mandate of equal protection of the
law. I called attention to unconscious racism not so much to make the case
that each of us as individuals harbored unconscious racist thoughts as to
make the case for the continued ubiquity of racism in our culture, and to
argue that if the constitutional value expressed in the Equal Protection

93
94

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
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Clause required the eradication of behavior motivated (or caused)95 by
racist beliefs, we needed to treat racism as a societal disorder or sickness.
We needed to respond to racism as epidemiologists rather than as moralists
or crime fighters.
The cognitive behavioral research begins with the goal of
understanding and demonstrating the source of bias in individuals. The
theory that informs this research posits an implicit system or “primitive”
part of the brain designed for reaction rather than reason. This system
specializes in mental shortcuts. Bias or stereotype occurs because the brain
works by placing information into categories. We make stereotyped
assumptions about others—good or bad—because categories that
correspond to those stereotypes are created in this primitive part of our
brain and those categories are available as a place to sort our perceptions.
People revert to the shortcuts of the implicit system of categorization
because this is the way our brain processes information. The theoretical
claim made by cognitive social psychologists is that stereotypes should be
understood as no different from other categorization constructs.96 Our
biases and prejudices result from the same process of categorization,
assimilation, and search for coherence that underlies all human cognition.97
The point of this research was to understand the process of
categorization. What cognition theory and the implicit bias experiments
have taught us about the content of those categories is an important byproduct of this enterprise, but incidental to the project’s thesis and purpose.
Cognitive behavior theory describes categorization as a consequence of the
natural way that each of us processes information. Implicit bias is
biological, normal, automatic, an inevitable product of the workings of an
individual’s brain. Cognitive theory sees stereotyping as “simply a form of
categorization, similar in structure and function to the categorization of
natural objects. . . . [S]tereotypes, like other categorical structures, are
cognitive mechanisms that all people, not just ‘prejudiced’ ones, use to
simplify the task of perceiving . . . .”98
95
Both anti-discrimination law and cognitive psychologists have used the word “motivation” to
mean that discriminatory conduct is intentional—that it originates in the individual’s or group’s desire
to harm another individual or group. Cognitive psychologists view Freudian psychology as
motivational because Freud theorized an unconscious that has its origins in repressed conscious
thoughts. Linda Krieger contrasts her own perspective with my own noting that: “While Professor
Lawrence does mention cognitive bias as a potential source of discriminatory decision-making, he
focuses primarily on discussing motivational rather than cognitive antecedents.” Krieger, supra note
20, at 1164 n.11 (emphasis added).
96
Krieger, supra note 20, at 1186–88 (citing the work of W. Edgar Vinacke, Stereotypes As
Social Concepts, 45 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 229, 229–30 (1957) and Joshua A. Fishman, An Examination of
the Process and Function of Social Stereotyping, 43 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 27, 45–52 (1956)).
97
Krieger, supra note 20 at 1186–87 (paraphrasing Henri Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice,
25 J. SOC. ISSUES 79, 80–82 (1969)).
98
Id. at 1188.
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By focusing on the process of categorization, we normalize bias and
make the content of white supremacy and the origins of that content
irrelevant to the analysis. When the process of categorization, rather than
the content of the categories, is our central concern, we turn our attention
away from questions like, “Why is racism so ubiquitous in these
categories?” “Why do we form categories that violate the value of human
equality?” and “Why we should assume collective responsibility for
correcting the consequences?” The bias in favor of whites is a prejudice
like any other preference, the natural product of categorization. This
description of the origin of bias suggests an inevitability—“We can’t help
it, we always categorize,” devolves easily back to, “It’s not our fault.”
Linda Krieger notes that “[t]he emergence of social cognition theory
represented a profound shift in psychologists’ thinking about intergroup
bias.”99 From the late 1940s and into the 1980s, social psychologists
believed that prejudice consisted of negative beliefs and feelings towards a
group that in turn caused negative behavior. Stereotypes of “outgroups”
were seen as caused by prejudice and serving to rationalize it. They
viewed prejudice as irrational, unjustifiable, pathological and abnormal, as
discontinuous from “normal” cognitive process. Social cognition theory
not only saw bias as part of the normal cognitive process, it argued that the
processes of categorization “might in and of themselves produce and
perpetuate intergroup bias.”100
This view that bias or stereotype grows out of the “normal” cognitive
process of categorization rather than out of learned prejudice suggests that
none of us is responsible for our bias or for the discriminatory behavior
that results from that bias. How can we judge someone blameworthy for
the normal functioning of the human brain? But, of course, the process of
categorization has content. This content is what defines the categories and
gives them meaning. Cognitive theory’s view of unconscious racism and
the perspective that inspires my cultural meaning test share two important
insights. Both speak of racial bias as often operating beyond our selfawareness and both describe racial bias as normal. But the theories differ
in an important way. When cognitive theorists call racial bias normal, they
refer to the normalcy of categorization—the fact that we all categorize as a
way of making sense of the world. When I say that racism is normal, I
refer to the ubiquity of racism—to the fact that our categories are filled
with a specific content: the ideology of white supremacy.
Mahzarin Banaji, one of the researchers who developed the Implicit
Association Test, was quoted in a Washington Post article as saying, “The
Implicit Association Test measures the thumbprint of culture on our minds
99

Id. at 1187.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
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. . . . If Europeans had been carted to Africa as slaves, blacks would have
the same beliefs about whites that whites now have about blacks.”101 Of
course, Europeans were not carted to Africa as slaves, and Banaji’s
hypothetical revision of history achieves the same result as Justice
Roberts’s equating the segregation condemned in Brown with the raceconscious policies designed to integrate the schools in Seattle. Cognitive
research’s focus on the process of categorization, like the Court’s focus on
the process of classification, skips the question of our responsibility for
what our history has wrought. Both turn our attention away from the
content of the categories and the meaning of that content. Both take white
supremacy (and anti-subordination) off the table as the central concern of
our justice project.
Cognitive behavior research focuses on individual bias. We take the
Implicit Association Test as individuals and it proves that each of us
harbors racial bias. Although the researchers count tens of thousands of
our responses and offer this as evidence that this racial bias is widespread,
many of my students and as many of my colleagues in the bar and legal
academy do not think this proves that what we do collectively through the
state has been infected by bias. For that, they say, we must prove
conscious intent. I have heard no logic to support the argument that
eighty-eight percent of white people and almost half of blacks may be
proved to harbor unconscious anti-black bias,102 but that this racism does
not infect those elected to represent us. Of course, the state action
requirement is the doctrinal rule that gives this argument authority,103 but
that doctrine, like the intent requirement, must have a logic of its own that
gives it some authority other than that it gains from white power.104
101

Vedantam, supra note 82.
Id.; Jay Dixit, Screen Test, SLATE, Jan. 26, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2134921. See also
Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Website,
6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101, 102, 105 (2002) (reporting results from 600,000 IATs on the popular online
website, including significant Black-White IAT results); Greenwald et al., supra note 82, at 1474,
1478.
103
By restricting the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to discrimination implicating the
government, the state action rule immunizes private discriminators from constitutional scrutiny. See
The Civil Rights Cases, United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 11–12, 24–25 (1883) (“[The Fourteenth
Amendment] does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of
private rights, but to provide modes of redress against the operation of state laws . . . .”); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 536–37 (1985) (“Limiting the
Constitution’s protections to state action preserves state sovereighty by giving the states almost
complete authority to regulate private behavior.”).
104
The doctrine embodies the notion in American life and law that racial discrimination can be
accurately and properly divided into two spheres: “public” and “private.” I have critiqued this view
elsewhere. See Lawrence, supra note 32, at 847; Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go, supra note 7, at
444–452 & nn.60–87; Lawrence, supra note 16, at 1389–90 & nn.79–86; see also Frank I. Michelman,
Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The Case of Pornography
Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 306 (1989); DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW
102
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I imagine that there is another unspoken argument or belief embedded
in my students’ resistance to reading proof of their own racism as sufficient
to hold us collectively responsible for that racism’s impact. This argument
asserts a right to be racist. If my implicit bias is only the product of my
mind’s categorization of lived experience, how can you pass moral
judgment on my prejudice?105
Legal scholars who have applied cognitive theory to legal problems
have focused primarily on its usefulness in proving that unconscious bias
influences an individual decision-maker’s actions and thereby renders
those actions discriminatory and unlawful. Anti-discrimination law
prohibits actions by an employer, police officer, or prosecutor that have
been tainted by impermissible considerations of race, and the research
done by cognitive psychologists can demonstrate that these impermissible
biases are at work even when the decision-maker is unaware of their
presence. For example, Linda Krieger’s groundbreaking article, The
Content of Our Categories, begins with a narrative about a Title VII
disparate treatment case on which she was working as a lawyer and her
realization that “something about the way the law was defining or seeking
to remedy disparate treatment discrimination was fundamentally
flawed.”106 She locates this flaw in Title VII jurisprudence’s construction
of discrimination—a construction that “while sufficient to address
deliberate discrimination . . . is inadequate to address the subtle, often
unconscious forms of bias that Title VII was also intended to remedy.”107
Her article’s thesis is that the failure of this construction “stems from the
assumption that disparate treatment discrimination, whether conscious or
unconscious, is primarily motivational, rather than cognitive, in origin.”108
Krieger identifies the law’s failure as a misunderstanding of the
psychological process that produces bias: The law thinks that
104–10 (2d ed. 1980). See generally Karl E. Klare, The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the
Struggle Against Racism: Perspectives from Labor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61 OR. L. REV. 157
(1982) (arguing that the distinction between public and private is a fundamental weakness in applying
state action to labor law).
105
For an example of this argument, see Wax & Tetlock, supra note 31; see also DINESH
D’SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY 24 (1995); RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 17–18, 77
(1992); Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of
Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 25; Richard Cohen, Closing the Door on Crime, WASH. POST,
Sept. 7, 1986, at W13, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File. I have critiqued this view
elsewhere. See generally Lawrence, supra note 16; Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go, supra note 7;
Lawrence, supra note 32; see also Ian F. Haney López, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a
New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1761–69 (2000). Of course, the state
action doctrine formalizes this right by holding that only government must abide by the Constitution’s
commands.
106
Krieger, supra note 20, at 1161–64.
107
Id.
108
Id.
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discriminatory treatment is caused by biased motivation when, in fact, the
origin of discriminatory bias is primarily cognitive—the product of the
process of categorization.109 While her analysis shifts the psychological
paradigm from motivation to the structure and process of cognition, the
legal question remains within the paradigm of individual fault and
causation. Unconscious bias is demonstrated to prove an individual’s
action has been caused at least in part by bias. Krieger employs cognitive
theory to challenge and expand Title VII law’s limited understanding of
the causal relationship between the human mind and human action. She
argues that the process of categorization within an individual’s brain
distorts her perception and that this distortion, rather than invidious motive,
results in biased and discriminatory decisions that violate the law. This
descriptive model tells a more accurate story about the origins of racial
bias, but the normative and legal injury that Krieger addresses is the one
identified as doctrinally relevant by the court in Davis and by Title VII’s
disparate treatment test.
This model understands the statutory,
constitutional, or normative harm of race discrimination as the biased, and
therefore wrongful, actions of one individual against another. Krieger’s
insight and analysis is a laudable and important intervention for litigators
who are called upon to tell this true and persuasive story within the
confines of existing antidiscrimination law, but it should not be confused
with my own.
I did not set out to invent a better tool for Title VII litigators. I sought
to challenge the disparate treatment paradigm itself. I argued that racism’s
harm was greater than the biased actions of individuals. I pointed to the
ubiquity of conscious and unconscious racism as evidence of the continued
vitality of racist ideology and argued that so long as this ideology lived and
flourished, the Constitution, and normative justice, required that we act
affirmatively to remedy its effects and disestablish its institutional
embodiments. The “cultural meaning” test does not ask whether bias
infects the decisions of the individual actors. Rather, it demonstrates the
continuing presence of racist belief in the larger society by discerning the
racial (or racist) meaning or interpretation that the relevant community
would give an act or decision that is not articulated or justified in explicitly
racial terms. These are two very different projects. One accepts the central
premise of the Davis intent requirement—that the harm of race
discrimination lies in individual acts infected by bias. The other rejects
that premise and finds the harm of racism in the pervasive effects of shared
racist ideology. I do not want to diminish the importance of the former
project, but to the extent that The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection is

109

Id. at 1165.
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linked to this limited critique, my more radical purpose is undermined.
I am not accusing the authors of this research and scholarship of being
unconcerned with racism and other forms of group subordination. The
research is directed primarily at demonstrating the prevalence of forms of
bias that motivate and justify behavior that creates and perpetuates racial
hierarchy and other conditions of dominance and subordination, and it is
clear that these empiricists seek to advance the cause of
antidiscrimination.111 What I caution against here is the direct, if
unintended, consequence of a particular method of describing prejudice. I
have described the way this research is read and received by those who
find it easier to avoid their own implication in and responsibility for
righting America’s racism. I think this work is interpreted to suggest the
most limited and least provocative conclusions for the same reason that
Americans are so ready to accept Justice Roberts’s unsupported assertion
110

Professor Amy Wax’s article in this Symposium provides an example of how my argument is
misunderstood or misrepresented by conflating and confusing it with the excellent but very different
work of those who have been inspired by and built upon my observation that antidiscrimination law
should take the role of the unconscious into account. Professor Wax says that she is writing a response
to “the work of Charles Lawrence and his acolytes,” but, regardless of how one views the merits of her
argument, its central thesis is the claim that the causal relationship between demonstrated unconscious
bias and the alleged discriminatory behavior of employers, law enforcement officers, and other
individuals has not been proved. Wax, supra note 31, at 981. For Wax, “discrimination occurs when
an individual is victimized by ill treatment that is causally linked to or based on a protected
characteristic.” Id. at 985 (emphasis added). She uses some forty pages to argue that, while the
cognitive research may have demonstrated pervasive racial bias, these studies have not demonstrated
that “mental states generate discrimination.” Id. Disparate impacts may be attributable to a decisionmaker’s reliance on neutral criteria, such as “‘supply side’ differences” in “groups’ overall ability” or
“average qualifications” rather than on their biases. Id. at 1022.
It may be objected that any group deficiencies in supply side determinants of
success are themselves traceable to unlawful discrimination and racism—past,
present, or both. Nothing here is to the contrary. But the observation . . . must be
sharply distinguished from the assertion that a particular company, organization, or
employer violates anti-discrimination laws by selecting, evaluating, or rewarding its
employees on the basis of group identity. . . . Employers and economic actors take
employees as they find them. That racism has contributed to making some
employees less qualified does not change the fact that they are less qualified.
Id. at 1005. She continues:
The question of what to do about the legacy of racial discrimination is highly
charged and controversial. But the fact that private actors respond to existing
disparities does not justify treating them as if they are responsible for those
disparities in the first place. . . . Rectifying past or present injustice by addressing
“root causes” is a fundamentally different exercise from claiming that a particular
social actor is discriminating.
Id. at 1005–06. Of course, the “objections” and “highly controversial” questions that Wax
distinguishes as not the subject of her article are objections and debates that I make central. I argue that
addressing the “root causes” of racism ought to be the project of antidiscrimination law. The “cultural
meaning” test directly asks whether any “group deficiencies in supply side determinants of success”
and our interpretation and reliance upon those “deficiencies” are indeed traceable to racism.
111
As social scientists they may deliberately understate their commitment to equality in order not
to appear “biased.” That scientists feel they must take care to be seen as “neutral” on the normative
question of racial equality in order to maintain their credibility as scientists is itself a commentary on
the continued salience and legitimacy of the ideology of white supremacy. One might ask why
“neutral” equals “no position on racism” while an avowed anti-racist stance is seen as partisan?
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that there is no racism to worry about except the racism of the
integrationist who would dare to notice race.
IV. HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE “FLOOD BEFORE THE FLOOD”
The white people got out, most of them, anyway. If
television and newspaper images can be deemed a statistical
sample, it was mostly black people who were left behind.
Poor black people, growing more hungry, sick and frightened
by the hour as faraway officials counseled patience and
warned that rescues take time. What a shocked world saw
exposed in New Orleans two years ago wasn't just a broken
levee. It was a cleavage of race and class, at once familiar
and startlingly new, laid bare in a setting where they
suddenly amounted to matters of life and death.112
I watched the news in stunned silence that first night after the storm.
Men, women, children, elderly people, too infirm to walk, newborn babies
were stranded on a freeway bridge above the water, within sight of the
Superdome, but unable to get there. They cried out to television cameras
and reporters, pleading for water and food. An old woman sat on the curb
beside her dead husband’s body and told of how he had died while she
begged passing police cars to stop and help them. Every face on that
freeway bridge was black, and I felt sick to my stomach with the
knowledge that this human suffering was not just the random horror of
natural disaster.113
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the flood in New Orleans,
we witnessed just how deeply race divides our nation. And our response,
as evidenced by our action, our inaction, our explanations and
justifications, is evidence of “cultural meaning”—of how we think about
racism, equal protection, and the meaning and relevance of intent.
A Gallup poll taken in the wake of Katrina found that six in ten
African Americans believed that the fact that most hurricane victims were
poor and black was one factor behind the failure of the federal government
to come to their rescue quickly. Nearly nine in ten non-Hispanic whites

112
Jason DeParle, Broken Levees, Unbroken Barriers,, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at 1 , available
at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
113
For critical essays on the social implications of the disaster and the deeper forces of structural
racism and social inequality that caused the poor and people of color to suffer disproportionately, see
generally THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A NATURAL DISASTER: RACE, CLASS, AND HURRICANE
KATRINA (Chester Hartman & Gregory D. Squires eds. 2006); WHAT LIES BENEATH: KATRINA, RACE,
AND THE STATE OF THE NATION (South End Press Collective ed. 2007); AFTER THE STORM: BLACK
INTELLECTUALS EXPLORE THE MEANING OF HURRICANE KATRINA (David Dante Trout ed. 2007).
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114

believed those were not factors.
President Bush on his first visit to New Orleans after the hurricane
denied that race played a role. “[M]y attitude is this,” he said, “The storm
didn’t discriminate and neither will the recovery effort. When those Coast
Guard choppers . . . were pulling people off roofs, they didn’t check the
color of a person’s skin.”115 But, for example, Rae Clifton, who is black
and was among those surveyed, displayed a widely held belief about the
impact of race on the administration’s handling of the disaster. “If it had
been a 17-year-old white cheerleader who was caught in the water,
somebody would have tried to get there faster,” she said.116
I was teaching a class in Constitutional Law during the week following
Katrina. The readings I had assigned for the day included the landmark
case of Washington v. Davis and The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection.
At the beginning of the class, I read the reactions from President Bush and
Ms. Clifton quoted above.
“I want you to keep this exchange in mind as we consider Washington
v. Davis, Arlington Heights and McCleskey v. Kemp,” I said. “I want you
to keep in mind the images we’ve seen from New Orleans and ask what
implication they have for how we should think about race and equal
protection.”
I asked my students to consider if the disagreement between President
Bush and Ms. Clifton, about whether the guys pulling people off roofs
were racist, was asking the wrong question. I asked, “Of what relevance to
equal protection analysis is the fact that when the Gallup Poll asked about
the people shown taking goods from stores in the aftermath of the storm,
whites by a margin of 50% to 44% said most of those involved were
criminals taking advantage of a situation, but blacks by a margin of 77% to
16% said they were mostly desperate people trying to find a way to
survive?”117
Of what relevance is New Orleans’s complex racial history? What
about the extreme levels of poverty, the highly segregated neighborhoods,
the failing schools, the deteriorated infrastructure and housing, the
undernourished children, the thousands of residents with no access to
health care and basic public services,118 that awaited Katrina before she
114
Susan Page & Maria Puente, Views of Whites, Blacks Differ Starkly on Disaster, USA TODAY,
Sept. 13, 2005, at 1A, available at LEXIS, News Library, USATDY File.
115
Transcript, President Bush in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, available at LEXIS,
News Library, NYT File.
116
Page & Puente, supra note 114.
117
Id. For an analysis of how racial images “framed” the stories and “facts” reported about
Hurricane Katrina and gave them meaning, see Cheryl Harris & Devon Carbado, Loot or Find: Fact or
Frame, in AFTER THE STORM, supra note 110, at 87, 87–88.
118
See Evangeline Franklin, A New Kind of Medical Disaster in the United States, in THERE IS
NO SUCH THING AS A NATURAL DISASTER, supra note 110, at 1, 3.
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came ashore—what Mari Matsuda has called “the flood before the
flood”?119 How is this storm related to our collective racism, conscious
and unconscious?
What was “the flood before the flood” in Seattle, Washington and
Louisville, Kentucky? How and why were the schools segregated in the
first place? What messages are conveyed to the world about the children
who attend those schools? When we picture the children in the segregated
all black schools, do they look like Little Black Sambo? Is this the picture
that causes white families to flee with their children to white suburbs and
private schools?120 Does this picture tell us that these children are less
intelligent, more violent, less precious, vulnerable and worthy of our care?
Is this why we allow their school buildings to deteriorate and crumble
around them? Is this why we believe they can only learn when we dumbdown the curriculum and teach them to chant scripted answers and ask no
questions?121 Do the black and brown children who hear and see these
messages all around them understand that they are Little Black Sambo?
Does it “affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely to ever be
undone”?122 When this message, that black and brown children are
inferior, is no longer written into the laws, when no school board acts with
conscious intent to send the message, when a federal district court issues
an order holding that a school district has achieved “unitary status,”123 is
119

Mari J. Matsuda, The Flood: Political Economy and Disaster, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 2

(2007).
120
See Lawrence, supra note 16, at 1368–75 (discussing the often unacknowledged fears that
cause white and middle class black parents to flee predominantly black urban schools); see also supra
note 15.
121
See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, Who is the Child Left Behind?: The Racial Meaning of
the New School Reform, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 699 (2006) (discussing the ways in which the No
Child Left Behind Act perpetuates and reinforces social class hierarchies and racist beliefs and
practices).
I want to make a larger point about the continuing segregation in American
education. Not only do we teach children in different schools, separated by race,
class, and how much money we spend; we also teach them differently. . . . We have
different expectations, aspirations, and goals. We are educating them for different
futures. We send them different messages about their value to us, to the world, and
to themselves.
Id. at 712–13.
122
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1953).
123
Building upon the principles articulated in Brown, the Supreme Court issued a series of
decisions in the 1960s forcing school districts to integrate public schools and create unitary school
systems. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Macklenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v.
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Decades later, the Rehnquist Court betrayed this commitment
to the Court’s decision in Brown through a radical reinterpretation of when schools are said to have
achieved “unitary status.” See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell,
498 U.S. 237 (1991). Recent decisions relieve school districts of the burden of proving that segregated
schools are not the result of past discrimination and require only good faith compliance with a court’s
desegregation order and the elimination of the harm of past discrimination “to the extent practicable.”
Dowell, 498 U.S. at 250; see also The Honorable David S. Tatel, Judicial Methodology, Southern
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the meaning of the message any less clear? Do these messages and their
meaning provide evidence of the continued vitality of white supremacy and
substantiate our legal and moral duty to continue to affirmatively act to
disestablish slavery’s legacy?
These are the questions I want my students to ask. They are the
questions that I hoped my article would provoke and that the best critical
scholars in law and science have asked and continue to ask. This is the
conversation we must have if we are to save our nation and our souls. If
my effort of twenty years ago to save my own sanity has advanced this
conversation even one small step, I am deeply gratified and thankful.
EPILOGUE
In the weeks before this Symposium went to press, a political
controversy placed the issue of race at the middle of the presidential
primary campaign and threatened to derail the candidacy of Senator Barack
Obama, a man whom many believe may well become our nation’s first
African American president. The texts and context of the controversy tell
a story that captures, in its full complexity, the essential lesson of The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection. I close this retrospective with a brief
reflection on those events.
The Reverend Jeremiah Wright is angry about racism. He is angry
about American violence, about the thousands of precious lives lost in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the Chicago neighborhood where he lives and
serves as Pastor of the 10,000 member Trinity United Church of Christ.
Jeremiah Wright speaks forthrightly about his anger with injustice. For
thirty-six years he has spoken from his pulpit, following the prophetic
tradition of his Old Testament namesake, giving voice to the injury and
anger of his flock and calling all of us to account for our sins against God
and our neighbors.124 In the black church vernacular, he “makes it plain.”
School Segregation, and the Rule of Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1071 (2004). Moreover, they hold that
once a school system has reached “unitary status” the desegregation order should be dissolved. See
Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248 (“Such decrees . . . are not intended to operate in perpetuity.”). The Court in
PICS adopted this radical view of “unitary status” and went one step further. The Court held that once
a school district has achieved “unitary status” it is actually unconstitutional for the district to continue
the integration plan it designed to comply with the prior desegregation order. See PICS, 127 S.Ct. at
2752 (“Once Jefferson County achieved unitary status it had remedied the constitutional wrong that
allowed race-based assignments. Any continued use of race must be justified on some other basis.”).
Justice Breyer’s dissent points out how the majority’s newfangled reading of “unitary status” runs
contrary to nearly half a century of Supreme Court precedent growing out of its decision in Brown. See
PICS, 127 S.Ct. at 2831 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“How could the plurality adopt a constitutional
standard that would hold unconstitutional large numbers of race-conscious integration plans adopted by
numerous school boards over the past 50 years while remaining true to this Court's desegregation
precedent?”).
124
Martin E. Marty who was Wright’s professor at the University of Chicago Divinity School
writes:
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Now he has been pushed into the glare of public scrutiny because Barack
Obama is a member of his flock. Opponents of Senator Obama’s
candidacy have excerpted the most provocative and intemperate of
Reverend Wright’s angry, plainly spoken words, circulated them widely on
the internet, and used them to brand him “separatist,” “anti-American,”
“anti-white,” to portray him in the stock image of an angry black man,
rightly hated and feared.125
Of course, Senator Obama is the primary target of these attacks on
Reverend Wright. Obama is called upon to denounce his pastor’s words
While Wright’s sermons were pastoral—my wife and I have always been awed
to hear the Christian Gospel parsed for our personal lives—they were also prophetic.
At the university, we used to remark, half lightheartedly, that this Jeremiah was
trying to live up to his namesake, the seventh-century B.C. prophet. Though
Jeremiah of old did not “curse” his people of Israel, Wright, as a biblical scholar,
could point out that the prophets Hosea and Micah did. But the Book of Jeremiah,
written by numbers of authors, is so full of blasts and quasi curses—what biblical
scholars call “imprecatory topoi”—that New England preachers invented a sermonic
form called “the jeremiad,” a style revived in some Wrightian shouts.
In the end, however, Jeremiah was the prophet of hope, and that note of hope is
what attracts the multi-class membership at Trinity and significant television
audiences. Both Jeremiahs gave the people work to do: to advance the missions of
social justice and mercy that improve the lot of the suffering. For a sample, read
Jeremiah 29, where the prophet's letter to the exiles in Babylon exhorts them to
settle down and “seek the peace and prosperity of the city to which I have carried
you into exile.” Or listen to many a Jeremiah Wright sermon.
Martin E. Marty, Prophet and Pastor, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 11, 2008, at B1,
available at LEXIS, News Library, CHEDUC File..
125
See, e.g., Richard Cohen, On Wright, What Took Obama So Long?, REAL CLEAR POLITICS,
Mar. 18, 2008, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/03/on_wright_what_obama_so_l.html
(“Why did Barack Obama take so long to ‘reject outright’ the harshly critical statements about America
made by his minister, Jeremiah Wright, not to mention the praise the same minister lavished on Louis
Farrakhan just last November?”); Jodi Kantor, Pastor’s Words Still Draw Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,
2008, at A18, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (“[D]espite Mr. Obama’s past attempts to
distance himself from the harshest language, critics continued to question whether Mr. Wright’s
statements reflect Mr. Obama’s beliefs.”); William M. Welch, Obama’s Ties To Minister May Be A
‘Big Problem,’ Some Say Senator Has Rejected Racial Comments, USA TODAY, Mar. 17, 2008, at 4A,
available at LEXIS, News Library, USATDY File (“Critics say Obama may not have ended the
controversy because he has had a relationship with Wright for nearly two decades.”). One might well
ask why Rev. Wright was so easily cast in this role. Wright volunteered for the Marine Corps during
the Vietnam War and received several White House commendations. He holds a degree from one of
the country’s most prestigious universities, has received several honorary doctorates, and served as a
faculty member at several seminaries. His church is known in Chicago for its hospitality, for its
devotion to physical and spiritual healing, and for education and active involvement in the civic life of
Chicago. White guests to Trinity report that they are welcomed and embraced when they worship
there. Why do his calls for America to confront its violence and history of oppression translate into
“He hates us”? Obama reminds his audience that segregation may be one explanation for why white
people found Wright’s words so shocking while most black people did not:
The fact that so many people are surprised to hear that anger in some of reverend
Wright’s sermons simply reminds us of the old truism that the most segregated hour
in American life occurs on Sunday morning.
Senator Barack Obama, Remarks in Philadelphia, Penn.: A More Perfect Union (Mar. 18, 2008),
available at http://www.barackobama.com/2008/03/18/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_53.php.
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126

and disown the man.
If he won’t, he is anti-American and anti-white.
He becomes the angry black man. Faced with this racist image-making,
with the demand that he publicly denounce black anger and implicitly
accept the demand’s premise that black anger is unwarranted, Obama
delivers a speech on the subject of race.127
Obama’s speech is wonderful. I listen as each sentence unfolds,
admiring his intelligence, his eloquence, his presence, worrying about how
he will frame the next difficult issue and smiling to myself with admiration
and pride as he chooses just the right word, metaphor, or story to capture
the full complexity and spirit of the truth he must tell. I am watching
Obama stand before the nation, breaking the taboo against speaking out
loud about our racism. This is the speech I’ve wanted him to give since the
beginning of the campaign. He asks us to confront our racism, to
acknowledge its roots in our nation’s history,128 to remember and
126

See, e.g., Tom Baldwin, Obama Is Urged To Disown Pastor Who Denounced America As
Racist, THE TIMES (LONDON), Mar. 15, 2008, at 55, available at LEXIS, News Library, TTIMES File;
Cohen, supra note 125; Welch, supra note 125. This was not the only attempt to portray Obama as the
dangerous black man by associating him with another black man whose words and images strike fear
into the hearts of most whites. Obama was also criticized for not rejecting the support of Louis
Farrakhan with enough force. See, e.g., Richard Cohen, Obama’s Farrakhan Test, WASH. POST, Jan.
15, 2008, at A13, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File. Attempting to make this point,
Senator Clinton said in a televised debate: “[T]here’s a difference between denouncing and
rejecting . . . . I just think, we’ve got to be even stronger. We cannot let anyone in any way say these
things, because of the implications they have, which can be so far reaching.” Responding, Obama
memorably quipped: “I have to say, I don’t see a difference between denouncing and rejecting . . . . But
if the word ‘reject’ Senator Clinton thinks is stronger than the word ‘denounce,’ then I’m happy to
concede the point, and I would reject and denounce.” The Democratic Debate In Cleveland, in N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 26, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/26/us/politics/26textdebate.html?
pagewanted=all).
127
Obama’s speech is delivered in Philadelphia across the street from the hall where the
Constitution’s framers gathered to write the nation’s foundational document. His title, “A More Perfect
Union,” echoes the Constitution’s preamble, and his opening paragraph reminds his audience that the
perfection of our union is unfinished business for which we are responsible. This theme echoes my
own position on bottom-up Constitutional construction. See Lawrence, Forbidden Conversations,
supra note 16, at 1398 (arguing that constitutional interpretation involves our “engaging in a
conversation about public morality and the values we hold collectively as a community, about the way
we choose to constitute ourselves as a people”); Charles R. Lawrence III, Promises to Keep: We are the
Constitution’s Framers, 1987 HOW. L.J. 645 (arguing that the Constitution “includes us—all of us—
that it calls upon each of us to be active participants in making the Constitution; in deciding which
constitutional values will be given primacy”).
128
Speaking of the Framers of the Constitution who had gathered in there in Philadelphia in 1787,
Obama said:
The document they produced was eventually signed but ultimately unfinished. It
was stained by this nation’s original sin of slavery, a question that divided the
colonies and brought the convention to a stalemate until the founders chose to allow
the slave trade to continue for at least twenty more years, and to leave any final
resolution to future generations.
Of course, the answer to the slavery question was already embedded within our
Constitution—a Constitution that had at its very core the ideal of equal citizenship
under the law; a Constitution that promised its people liberty, and justice, and a
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appreciate the sacrifice and bravery of parents and grandparents who
struggled to narrow the gap between our nation’s ideals and our legacy of
slavery and Jim Crow,129 to know that this legacy lives with us still. He
wants us to understand that we share this history and the illness it has
wrought,130 to use our knowledge and understanding to heal ourselves of
the disease of racism. It hardly seems possible.131 Barack Obama has
made the subject of my life’s work the subject of his speech.
Once again, I am aware that I do not watch this speech alone, that
millions of other Americans are hearing this text and giving it meaning.132
Like the text in Little Black Sambo and the text of the of the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools, Senator
Obama’s speech is filled with racial images and I watch the speech
union that could be and should be perfected over time.
Obama, supra note 125.
129
Speaking of the great, long struggle and those who sacrificed to work towards the promise of
our Constitution, Obama says:
And yet words on a parchment would not be enough to deliver slaves from
bondage, or provide men and women of every color and creed their full rights and
obligations as citizens of the United States. What would be needed were Americans
in successive generations who were willing to do their part—through protests and
struggle, on the streets and in the courts, through a civil war and civil disobedience
and always at great risk—to narrow that gap between the promise of our ideals and
the reality of their time.
Id.
130
Obama does not say that “we are all racists,” as I have said, Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 322, or that structural racism remains and is justified by racist
ideology, see supra notes 17, 23–24, 35–36 and accompanying text, but that is his clear meaning.
Consider when he says:
Understanding this reality requires a reminder of how we arrived at this point. As
William Faulkner once wrote, “The past isn't dead and buried. In fact, it isn't even
past.” We do not need to recite here the history of racial injustice in this country.
But we do need to remind ourselves that so many of the disparities that exist in the
African-American community today can be directly traced to inequalities passed on
from an earlier generation that suffered under the brutal legacy of slavery and Jim
Crow.
Obama, supra note 125.
131
My predisposition to disbelief does not come from an earlier conviction that Obama did not
previously believe what he now speaks. Rather, I could not imagine that Obama could say these things
as a serious contender for the presidency. Until this time, he had seldom spoken directly about issues
of race or racism. Of course, his blackness spoke always of race but it was others who made his
blackness an issue.
132
Obama’s speech instantly became one of the most popular videos on YouTube and has, as of
April 4, 2008, been viewed more than four million times on that site.
See YouTube,
http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=obama+philadelphia+race&search_type= (last visited
Apr. 8, 2008) (noting that Obama’s speech entitled “A More Perfect Union” has been viewed over four
million times); see also Speech on Race Tops YouTube, NPR, Mar. 20, 2008, available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88650809 (reporting that as of March 20, 2008,
Obama’s speech had been clicked more than 1.6 million times and had been commented on more than
four thousand times). This, coupled with the sound bites played on the television and radio news
networks, brought his words to an unprecedented audience, especially for a primary season campaign
speech.
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knowing that our collective history and experience will give those images
meaning. I know that the images we will see and the meanings we will
take from this text are determined not only by the text itself, but by the face
of the speaker.
One cannot mistake Barack Obama for anything other than a black
man. The Media has dubbed him a “post-racial” candidate.133 When a
euphoric multiracial crowd of Obama campaign workers and supporters
gathered to celebrate his historic victory in the South Carolina primary
they chanted: “Race doesn’t matter!”134 But race does matter in America,
Supreme Court pronouncements of our colorblindness notwithstanding.
Obama’s candidacy compels us to ask, “Are we capable of electing a Black
president? Are we capable of overcoming and moving beyond our
racism?” We cannot answer those questions in the affirmative while we
deny our racism.
Even as I rejoice in the truth and eloquence of Obama’s words, I
experience uneasiness and apprehension. I am fearful that he has spoken
too much truth, too forthrightly; that even this carefully crafted speech will
produce the backlash that always comes when one speaks truth to power.135
Within hours of the speech, a host of pundits and commentators descend
on his words, eager to dissect, analyze, reinterpret, assault and condemn.
Many of these commentators lift passages from Obama’s speech and
reframe them to distort his meaning and silence his truth.136 They seek to
133
See The Cook Spoils Obama’s Broth: Race and the Democrats, ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 2008,
available at LEXIS, News Library, ECON File (“Mr. Obama’s candidacy at first seemed a post-racial
triumph.”); Peter J. Boyer, The Political Scene: The Color of Politics, NEW YORKER, Feb. 4, 2008, at
38, available at LEXIS, News Library, NEWYRK File (discussing Obama and Newark Mayor Gary
Booker as two African American politicians who transcend race); Tim Rutten, The Good Generation
Gap, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2008, at 31, available at LEXIS, News Library, LAT File (reporting that “he
personifies and articulates the post-racial America in which most of our young people now live”). See
contra Gary Younge, Some Things Even Obama Can’t Transcend, THE NATION, Feb. 11, 2008,
available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080211/younge (“[B]efore we can talk sensibly about
transcending difference, we must first transform the conditions that give these differences meaning.”).
134
See Alec MacGillis, A Margin That Will Be Hard to Marginalize, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2008,
at A01, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File.
135
See Mari Matsuda, Love Change, 17 J.L. & FEMINISM 185, 187 n.10 (2005) (pointing out that
some commentators attributed Senator Kerry’s loss in the 2004 presidential election to a backlash
against Democrats for their modest support of civil unions, and making the case for persisting in the
fight for the marriage rights of all people—the risk of political backlash notwithstanding); Cynthia
Tucker, King’s Courage Should Not Be Reduced To Caricature, Yahoo! News, Mar. 29, 2008,
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ucas/20080329/cm_ucas/kingscourageshouldnotbereducedtocaricature
(quoting Martin Luther King, Jr. as saying, “The most popular explanation for the backlash is that it is a
response to Negro ‘aggressiveness’ and ‘excessive demands.’ It is further attributed to an overzealous
government which is charged with so favoring Negro demands that it has stimulated them beyond
reason. These are largely half-truths and, as such, whole lies.”).
136
See, e.g., William Kristol, Let’s Not, And Say We Did, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2008, at A23,
available at LEXIS, News Library, NYTIMES File (“Nor was I shocked when Obama compared
Reverend Wright, who was using his pulpit to propagate racial resentment, with his grandmother, who
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break the bridge of shared humanity that Obama has labored so mightily to
build in his campaign and in this speech. They signal to white people,
“This man Obama is not you. Remember he is black and black folks are
not us.” They do this in the coded language of colorblindness, a language
that invokes racism’s images even as it denies racism’s existence or
attributes racism only to those who dare remove white supremacy’s
colorblind disguise. They never say Obama is scary because he is black.
Instead, they use Jeremiah Wright, with his afro-centric robes and
unguarded angry words, to re-cast Obama as scarily black. Obama’s
answer was to confront the image, to say our history has made blackness
scary. The image of blackness as violent, angry, hateful, is not true. Now
the truth-silencers strike back by telling the lie again and again, calling
Wright, now Obama’s surrogate, white-hating and separatist. The
commentators position themselves as colorblind and Wright (now Obama)
becomes the separatist who is racist. Like Justice Roberts in PICS, they
turn reality upside-down, denying the existence of white supremacy’s
structure and meaning in order to silence those who exhort us to be
conscious of our racism so that we can heal ourselves.
The day after Obama gives his speech I present and discuss this Article
with my colleagues at a works-in-progress seminar. The racism at the core
may have said privately a few things that made Obama cringe, or with Geraldine Ferraro, whom ‘some
have dismissed . . . as harboring some deep-seated bias.’”); see also The Daily Show, The Dialogue
Begins, Mar. 19, 2008, available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/video/index.jhtml?videoId
=164521&title=the-dialogue-begins (lampooning the cable network news’ coverage of Obama’s speech
and their penchant to, in Obama’s words, “tackle race only as spectacle”). Obama anticipated this
backlash and warned of it in his speech, calling on Americans to resist this old brand of politics by
division:
For we have a choice in this country. We can accept a politics that breeds
division, and conflict, and cynicism. We can tackle race only as spectacle—as we
did in the OJ trial—or in the wake of tragedy, as we did in the aftermath of
Katrina—or as fodder for the nightly news. We can play Reverend Wright’s
sermons on every channel, every day and talk about them from now until the
election, and make the only question in this campaign whether or not the American
people think that I somehow believe or sympathize with his most offensive words.
We can pounce on some gaffe by a Hillary supporter as evidence that she’s playing
the race card, or we can speculate on whether white men will all flock to John
McCain in the general election regardless of his policies.
We can do that.
But if we do, I can tell you that in the next election, we’ll be talking about some
other distraction. And then another one. And then another one. And nothing will
change.
That is one option. Or, at this moment, in this election, we can come together
and say, “Not this time.” This time we want to talk about the crumbling schools that
are stealing the future of black children and white children and Asian children and
Hispanic children and Native American children. This time we want to reject the
cynicism that tells us that these kids can’t learn; that those kids who don’t look like
us are somebody else's problem. The children of America are not those kids, they
are our kids, and we will not let them fall behind in a 21st century economy. Not
this time.
Obama, supra note 125.
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of the attack on Obama is the new shared text I ask my colleagues to
confront. I ask them to consider the challenge that Obama faces when he
makes this speech, when he asks us to confront and heal our racism, even
as we suffer from the disease, even while there are those who seek to feed
the cancer, even as he stands surrounded by the images that racism has
created.
I begin my presentation by showing several visual images. The first is
a drawing of Little Black Sambo. The image comes from the cover of the
1899 London edition of the book. In the slides that follow there are several
other iconic images of Black people as America has imagined us: a white
minstrel in blackface; a cartoon caricature of a black uniformed waiter with
huge distorted red lips in a wide smile, the restaurant’s name printed on his
white teeth—“Coon-chicken Inn;” advertisements for Aunt Jemima
Pancakes and Rastus Cream of Wheat; a photograph of Flavor Flav—a
contemporary minstrel in clownish garb. Interspersed among these images
I have placed a photograph of myself from the Georgetown web site, a
photograph of the Reverend Jeremiah Wright wearing afro-centric
vestments, and a photograph of Barack Obama taken as he delivered his
speech in Philadelphia. I want my colleagues to see that these images
stand beside Barack Obama nearly blocking our ability to see him as he is,
in his intelligence, and empathetic generosity toward his audience, asking
Americans to hear our history and know the truth of our racism. The
picture of my face among the others signals that these images also stand
with me as I speak.
Obama’s foes have used Jeremiah Wright to remind us that all of these
images represent Obama’s kin. They deploy these images so that we will
feel their presence without knowing they are there, without asking why
their presence makes Obama less human, less one of us. I want to expose
the images, to make my colleagues conscious of the cultural meaning
found in the demand that Obama denounce his pastor, a meaning that we
have pushed into our unconscious. I want them to hear how Obama
responds to his foes, knowing he must speak directly to the images if he is
to prove them false.
I read the following passage from Obama’s speech.
Like other predominantly black churches across the
country, Trinity embodies the black community in its
entirety—the doctor and the welfare mom, the model student
and the former gang-banger. Like other black churches,
Trinity's services are full of raucous laughter and sometimes
bawdy humor. They are full of dancing, clapping, screaming
and shouting that may seem jarring to the untrained ear. The
church contains in full the kindness and cruelty, the fierce
intelligence and the shocking ignorance, the struggles and
successes, the love and yes, the bitterness and bias that make
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up the black experience in America.
And this helps explain, perhaps, my relationship with
Reverend Wright. As imperfect as he may be, he has been
like family to me. He strengthened my faith, officiated my
wedding, and baptized my children. Not once in my
conversations with him have I heard him talk about any
ethnic group in derogatory terms, or treat whites with whom
he interacted with anything but courtesy and respect. He
contains within him the contradictions—the good and the
bad—of the community that he has served diligently for so
many years.
I can no more disown him than I can disown the black
community. I can no more disown him than I can my white
grandmother—a woman who helped raise me, a woman who
sacrificed again and again for me, a woman who loves me as
much as she loves anything in this world, but a woman who
once confessed her fear of black men who passed by her on
the street, and who on more than one occasion has uttered
racial or ethnic stereotypes that made me cringe.
These people are a part of me. And they are a part of
America, this country that I love.137
Obama understands the racial message and meaning in the demand that
he disassociate himself from Reverend Wright. He knows that this demand
is about more than his pastor’s intemperate words. Obama refuses to
disown Jeremiah Wright or the community of black people.138 He says I
137

Id.
Although Obama did not disown Reverend Wright or his anger at injustice, he did distance
himself from Wright’s comments calling them “wrong” and “divisive” and characterizing them as
expressing “a profoundly distorted view of this country—a view that sees white racism as
endemic . . . .” I found this troubling. For in distancing himself from Wright’s words, Obama appeared
to deny the substance of Wright’s meaning as well as the words that Wright had chosen. Obama’s
detractors were demanding that he disown his kinship with his pastor and Obama refused, but they
were also demanding that he distance himself from the more radical content of Wright’s words and
Obama seemed to accede to this demand. These two different responses represent the tightrope that
Obama, the presidential candidate, is forced to walk. He cannot use the words “white supremacy” as I
have in this Article. He must speak of our shared racism in a way that his audience can hear him. He
can embrace his pastor, but he must be careful about embracing his pastor’s radicalism.
Obama’s opponents have employed another image in seeking to render him silent in the face of
racism. They have used his Muslim heritage to evoke a racialized image of adherents of Islam. See
Maureen Dowd, What’s in a Name, Barry?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2006, at A15, available at LEXIS,
News Library, NYT File; Adam Freedman, The Object of His Rejection, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, at
11, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (discussing Clinton’s call for Obama to “reject” as
well as “denounce” Farrakhan); Joe Garafoli, Right Wing Plays Muslim Card Against Obama, SAN.
FRAN. CHRON., Feb. 28, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/
a/2008/02/28/MNKGVABG8.DTL&hw=right+wing&sn=007&sc=637; Jim Kuhnhen, Obama Fights
138
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am one of these people, too. We are not as white supremacy imagines us
and neither are you. We cannot ignore the continuing legacy of a nation
born in slavery. We cannot deny the existence of our segregated schools,
neighborhoods, and churches. We cannot ignore the images that stand
beside me as I speak. These images stand here with me, and we must see
them clearly before we can understand the injury they do. This work of
coming face to face with our racism and reconstructing our images of each
other and ourselves is the unfinished business of forming a more perfect
union.
I began this reflection on The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection with a
text that felt like a nightmare and made me despair. The Supreme Court
majority in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District had turned Brown v. Board of Education on its head, declaring it
unconstitutional for us to see our racism, to speak of it out loud, to make it
visible so that we can fight it together. I close with a text both hopeful and
difficult. A text from a black presidential candidate who challenges us to
see the cultural meaning that white supremacy has constructed, to see it so
that we can begin the work of reconstructing those meanings and our
shared humanity. We must choose the latter text, with our eyes and hearts
open, and do this difficult work that will make our wounded world whole.

Rumors About Islam, Senator Rejects Farrakhan; Says Repeatedly He Is a Christian, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Feb. 28, 2008, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, CHRGAZ File. The silencing
power of this image is apparent in Obama’s exclusion of Muslims from his truth speaking and inclusive
lesson on American racism. In the same paragraph that he distances himself from Wright’s words, he
makes his only reference to Islam saying that Wright’s remarks expressed a view “that sees the
conflicts in the Middle East as rooted primarily in the actions of stalwart allies like Israel, instead of
emanating from the perverse and hateful ideologies of Islam.” Obama, supra note 125. Here, Obama
might have taught the same lesson he taught in countering the racialized images of blackness by
invoking Reverend Wright’s full humanity and explaining his anger within the context of the black
experience with oppressive racism. Instead, Obama participates in the post 9/11 racialized imagery that
equates Islam with terrorism and renders all Muslims terrorists in our eyes. As my colleague Professor
Lama Abu Odeh has noted, “While Obama explains black rage to white Americans, he completely fails
to explain Muslim rage to Americans. In a post-9/11 world, we Muslims are way too hot to touch and
he drops us as surely as he has dropped his middle name Hussein.” Lama Abu-Odeh, Remarks at a
Georgetown University Law Center Panel Discussion Titled “Perfecting the Union: Obama, Race, and
Religion” (Apr. 7, 2008) (on file with author).

